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PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF DISEASE DIAGNOSIS
Shahrokh Falati, Ph.D., J.D. *
The U.S. Supreme Court effectively redefined the scope of patent
eligible subject matter when it decided Mayo. 1 This decision focused
on medical diagnostic technology and has had a profound effect on
the biotechnology and personalized medicine industries in the
United States. Subsequent back-to-back decisions by the Supreme
Court in Myriad 2 and Alice 3 have made it unequivocally clear that
there is now wholesale broadening of the judicially created
exceptions to statutory laws governing patent eligible subject
matter. This has caused havoc in the biopharmaceutical industry by
not only making it a near impossibility to obtain a patent in certain
fields, but also by vastly increasing the number of medical
diagnostic patents being invalidated based on Section 101 of Title
35 of the U.S. Code. This major change in law has had unintended
consequences, discouraging research and development necessary
for new medical diagnostic and therapeutic methods to come to
market. This article analyzes the patent eligibility legal landscape
and focuses on emerging medical diagnostic technologies to explain
why the Supreme Court’s recent rulings were made in error. I end
by discussing how Congress could either abolish, as unnecessary,
the non-statutory, Supreme Court-created, exceptions to
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1
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
2
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
3
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
*
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Section 101, or to amend the statute. Only by doing so can our laws
once again encourage and reward creative thinkers and
entrepreneurs who take risk and innovate new medical diagnostic
technologies in the U.S.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Patents drive technological innovation in our society. The
mechanism by which they do this is to reward those who make a
novel contribution in their field with a monopoly that can bring the
patent owner a financial benefit. At the same time, patent law
encourages inventors to ultimately disclose their inventions to the
public, so that the public at large benefits from technological
innovation and progress.
In the United States, for any technology or invention to be
patentable, it must first be deemed to be a subject matter that is
“patent eligible.” 4 If it is not a patent eligible subject matter, it will
be impossible to obtain protection for that technology under U.S.
patent law. Yet, even if it is subject matter that is deemed to be
“patent eligible,” the technology must then also be found by the U.S.

4

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (outlining the requirements for patentability).
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Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to be (1) useful, (2) novel,
and (3) nonobvious before a patent can be issued. 5
An invention is eligible for a patent under Section 101 only if it
is a process or method, machine or apparatus, manufacture, or
composition of matter, and only if it falls outside of three judicially
created exceptions to patentability. These judicially created
exceptions to the subject matter expressly stated in the statute
include laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. 6
Natural phenomena embody anything that could be discovered in
nature; 7 natural laws include correlations and laws determining how
the natural world works; 8 and abstract ideas can be anything from
mathematical formulas to fundamental economic practices. 9
The Supreme Court had decades ago decided that Congress
intended patent eligible subject matter, under Section 101, to
“include anything under the sun that is made by man.” 10 Yet, in three
recent back-to-back Supreme Court decisions, 11 the Court has
effectively redefined the scope of patent eligible subject matter by
greatly expanding the scope of the judicially-created exceptions to
the statutory patent eligibility laws, thereby significantly narrowing
the scope of subject matter that is patent eligible. Moreover, with
this recent change, there are now two lines of Supreme Court cases
See Novelty and Non-obviousness, Conditions for Obtaining a Patent, USPTO
(Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-informationconcerning-patents#heading-5 [https://perma.cc/A2KW-9E48].
6
Id.
7
Myriad, 569 U.S. 576 (contrasting the discovery of natural phenomena with
invention).
8
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)
(deciding that the relation between certain blood metabolites and the likelihood a
drug, thiopurine, being “ineffective or cause harm” was “a consequence of the
ways in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body” and therefore
an ineligible natural law).
9
Robert Sachs, The Alice Guidance Categories of Potential Abstract Ideas,
BILSKI BLOG (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.bilskiblog.com/2014/09/day-3example-categories-of-potential-abstract-ideas/ [https://perma.cc/RSY2-7L8E].
10
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that a bacterium that
had been genetically modified to effectively digest oil can be patented).
11
Mayo, 566 U.S. 66; Myriad, 569 U.S. 576; Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
5
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that are inconsistent and contradict each other. 12 The effect of this
uncertainty has been profound, devastating the biotechnology,
personalized medicine, and medical diagnostics industries in the
United States.
The field of personalized medicine is fast evolving and now
allows for tailored therapeutic strategies for both treatment and
prevention purposes based on an individual’s unique genomic and
proteomic profile. 13 This is a rapidly growing field of technology
that is proving to be transformational for medical interventions. The
success of personalized medicine hinges on new and innovative
medical diagnostic technologies. These medical diagnostic
technologies are generally used in clinical medicine to identify the
patient’s condition and therefore provide for early and effective
treatment of the particular disease at hand. Being able to accurately
diagnose a disease with low chance of a missed diagnosis, an error
in diagnosis, or a delayed diagnosis are all crucial features in the
management of a disease, and all are dependent on newly emerging
medical diagnostic technologies.
Unsurprisingly to many patent law practitioners with a
biomedical background, the Supreme Court’s recent Mayo decision
resulted in a dramatic increase in patent offices rejecting
applications related to personalized medicine and medical
diagnostics fields. Indeed, according to one study, while prior to the
Mayo decision only 15.9 percent of personalized medicine-related
patent applications had rejections based on a lack of subject matter
eligibility, this grew staggeringly to 86.4 percent post-Mayo. 14 In
See discussion of Mayo in view of Diehr, infra Sections III.b and IV.b; see
also John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for
Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1765, 1776 (2014). Historically, I would point out that there are four primary
Supreme Court cases that showcase two separate approaches to patent eligibility.
Current law is, in large part, an extension of Funk Bros. and Flook decisions,
however, existing contrary approaches to patent eligibility by Supreme Court
include the Chakrabarty and Diehr decisions.
13
See discussion infra Part IV.a.
14
Bernard Chao & Amy Mapes, An Early Look at Mayo’s Impact on
Personalized Medicine, 2016 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 10 (2016). It should be
noted that this study did not include any analysis of the ultimate outcome of these
rejections in order to see if any rejections are withdrawn in view of attorney
12
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another recent article, 15 the authors point out that the new patent
eligibility legal framework resulted in no less than 830 patent
applications being abandoned at the USPTO within the first six
weeks of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo. 16 Courts have used
this new test to invalidate patent claims at a rate no less than 83
percent during that same period. 17 Two years after the Supreme
Court changed the law in Alice, the numbers were largely similar,
with the Federal Circuit using Alice to reject patent claims at a rate
of more than 90 percent in both 2015 and 2016. 18
By 2019, the Federal Circuit invalidated more than three
quarters of cases it has heard on patent eligibility in those five years
since the recent Supreme Court rulings.19 Professor Osenga has
nicely summarized by positing that “[t]he doctrine of patent-eligible
subject matter is a mess, and it is weakening patent rights in this
country. Nearly everyone, from the bar to the bench and from
academia to industry, has called for reform.” 20 Indeed, other scholars
arguments, something that would be important in assessing the ultimate practical
effects of the Supreme Court’s recent patent-eligibility decisions.
15
Jasper L. Tran & J. Sean Benevento, Alice at Five, 2019 PATENTLY-O
PATENT L.J. 25 (2019).
16
Id.
17
Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year Review of Alice v. CLS Bank,
97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 545 (2015); see also, Tristan Gray-Le
Coz & Charles Duan, Apply It to the USPTO: Review of the Implementation of
Alice v. CLS Bank in Patent Examination, 2014 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1, 3
(2014).
18
Id. (showing that the Federal Circuit used Alice as a basis to reject 94.1
percent of patent claims in 2015 and 92.3 percent of patent claims in 2016).
19
Robert R. Sachs et al., Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Alice v CLS Bank Five
Years on, IAM (May 23, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/benevolent-despotor-tyrant-alice-v-cls-bank-five-years [https://perma.cc/8LP4-CHYE]. The data
covers software and biotechnology/life science patents but excludes Alice
challenges for covered business method (CBM) review. For a brief summary of
post-Alice cases, see Overview of Section 101 Patent Cases Decided After Alice
v. CLS (as of March 1, 2019), GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER,
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Overview-ofSection-101-Patent-Cases-Decided-After-Alice-v-CLS-as-of-03-01-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BQ9Y-GCF6] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
20
Kristen Osenga, Institutional Design for Innovation: A Radical Proposal for
Addressing § 101 Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1191, 1191
(2019).
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have described the new Supreme Court test as one that “forces lower
courts to engage in mental gymnastics,” 21 is “a foggy standard
cloaked as a rule,” 22 a “crisis of confusion” 23 and others have seen
the new patent eligibility law as so aggressive that “the penumbra
around pure abstract ideas and natural phenomena is growing
larger.” 24 Moreover, many judges on the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit have openly expressed their frustration with this new
patent eligibility standard. 25
The current legal framework has had particularly harmful
consequences in the medical diagnostics industry. Existing
biomedical patents are being struck down as invalid at the earliest
pleading stages of litigations. The USPTO, confused on how to
apply this new standard, has issued no less than five separate
examination guidelines on how to apply the standard in as many
years, 26 making it all but impossible to obtain any meaningful patent

Annal D. Vyas, Alice in Wonderland v. CLS Bank: The Supreme Court’s
Fantastic Adventure into Section 101 Abstract Idea Jurisprudence, 9 AKRON
INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 2 (2015). See also Brief of 19 Law Professors as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnosis,
Inc. et al. (2016) [hereinafter Sequenom Amicus Brief].
22
Michael Risch, Nothing Is Patentable, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 45 (2015).
23
David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149,
2164 (2017).
24
Risch, supra note 22.
25
See discussion infra Part IV. Former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), Judge Michel, predicted that the new
Supreme Court for patent eligibility would “create total chaos,” stating that it is
“too vague, too subjective, too unpredictable and impossible to administer in a
coherent, consistent way in the patent office or in the district courts or even in the
federal circuit.” See Gene Quinn, Judge Michel Says Alice Decision ‘will create
total chaos,’ IPWATCHDOG.COM (Aug. 2, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2014/08/06/judge-michel-says-alice-decision-will-create-total-chaos/id=50696/
[https://perma.cc/57UC-GMPE]. Chief Judge of the CAFC, Judge Rader, referred
to the CAFC’s inability to render a majority opinion in Alice as the greatest failure
of his career. In his view, interpretation of Section 101 was simply settled law,
based on Diehr and Chakrabarty.
26
The latest version of the USPTO Subject Matter Eligibility guidelines was
published in October of 2019. Update on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,
USPTO (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/updatepatent-subject-matter-eligibility [https://perma.cc/5Z53-DTU3].
21
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protection for innovations in both the medical diagnostics and the
wider life sciences and biotechnology industries. 27
As just one example, the United States faces the unusual specter
of having its patent laws render a new medical diagnostic method
for non-invasively detecting abnormalities in the fetus of a pregnant
woman as patent ineligible subject matter, while the highest courts
in both the United Kingdom and Australia found the same
technology to be eligible for patent protection. 28 Ceding ground to
foreign countries in fostering new medical diagnostic technology
development and talent retention issues aside, the less than desirable
position we face today in the United States sees opportunistic freeriders taking advantage of this anomaly in current U.S. patent law to
move in, copy innovative products, and gain market share at the
expense of our innovators.
The reason the medical diagnostics industry is particularly
sensitive to patent laws is because very large capital investments are
necessary. It typically costs more than one billion dollars to develop
a brand-new drug 29 or a medical diagnostic test. 30 Investors and
company executives make decisions based on certainty and how the
law can protect their investment from copycats. The argument raised
by some that patents somehow block innovation and are ultimately
of less value rings especially hollow when it is applied to the
medical diagnostics industry.
This article argues that for the U.S. to regain its pole position in
the arena of technological innovation within the medical diagnostics
industry, Congress needs to act swiftly to amend the law
See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part IV.b.
29
Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: new
estimates of R&D costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20–33 (May 2016). This research
and development cost study was published by Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development.
30
EUR. OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYST. & POL’Y, ENSURING INNOVATION IN
DIAGNOSTICS FOR BACTERIAL INFECTION, EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH
SYSTEMS AND POLICIES 44 (Chantal Morel et al. eds., 2016). Rick Mullin, Cost to
Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $2.5B, SCI. AM. (Nov. 24,
2014),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-to-develop-newpharmaceutical-drug-now-exceeds-2-5b/ [https://perma.cc/EA4M-SGCK].
27
28
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highlighting that it disagrees with the Supreme Court’s recent
trilogy of patent eligibility decisions. As a mechanism for doing so
and given where we are, this article proffers two strategies for
Congress to decide between in order to better determine whether a
subject matter is eligible for patent protection. Congress should act
by either (1) amending Section 101, or (2) by abolishing, in toto, the
non-statutory, Supreme Court-promulgated, exceptions to this
statute. Either path will restore a balance to the laws that both fosters
and encourages technology innovators to develop new medical
diagnostic technologies that address patient needs of today and
tomorrow.
Parts II and III of this article begin with the constitutional
foundation of laws concerning patent eligibility and their legislative
development. The focus then shifts to patent eligibility
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court going back over a century,
highlighting the Court’s judicial activism in the recent trilogy of
cases between 2012–2014, which effectively created its own
expansive parallel set of laws alongside the statutory language
concerning patent eligibility.
Parts IV and V introduce the field of personalized medicine and
medical diagnostics, later focusing in depth on how these recent
Supreme Court decisions on patent eligibility have affected medical
diagnostic technologies and discussing how the non-statutory,
Supreme Court-created, exceptions to patent eligibility laws have
negatively affected the protection and the development of such key
emerging biomedical technologies in the United States.
Scholars and stakeholders in the legal and biomedical
community have begun to actively seek a fix from Congress because
many in the biomedical community, especially those in the medical
diagnostics industry, see the current status quo as being untenable.
While some have proposed to keep the Supreme Court-created
exceptions and have a “practical application” test, as thoughtfully
proposed by other intellectual property (“IP”) law professors, 31
others, including the former Director of the U.S. Patent and
See Sequenom Amicus Brief, supra note 21 (focusing on arguments by
Professors Lefstin & Menell).
31
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Trademark Office, have argued for wholesale repeal of Section 101
from the Patent Act. 32
In the penultimate section, part VI, this article concludes by
encouraging Congress to act and bring certainty to this fundamental
area of patent law in order to encourage innovators to once again
invest and seek to develop new medical diagnostic technologies that
have the potential to benefit the public. The article does not propose
for the wholesale repealing of the statute, but advocates for avoiding
yet another round of massaging a body of newly created law that has
had more than five years to develop and has proved unworkable and
difficult to apply in practice.
None of the Supreme Court created exceptions to the patent
eligibility statute under Section 101 are in fact necessary because
existing statutes under the Patent Act, unrelated to Section 101, will
address the concerns the Supreme Court had when it created the
exceptions. The Supreme Court’s recent activism on this issue,
which ironically the Court itself warned had the power to “swallow
all of patent law” 33 and “eviscerate patent law,” 34 and the resulting
mayhem it has now in fact caused, has greatly harmed the innovation
ecosystem, especially damaging the medical diagnostics industry in
the U.S.
If the reader is left unconvinced that abolishing, in toto, the nonstatutory, Supreme Court-promulgated, exceptions to Section 101 is
the way forward, this article also offers possible amendments to the
law so as to defang these exceptions and bring them in line with
32
Steven Lundberg, Dave Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101, NAT’L L.
REV. (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/dave-kappos-callsabolition-section-101 [https://perma.cc/3DDK-4YQF]. David Kappos was the
Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from 2009–2013. Id.
33
The Supreme Court advised the lower courts in Alice to “tread carefully in
construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.” (emphasis
added). Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014).
34
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)
(emphasis added). Two years prior to Alice, the Supreme Court in Mayo further
warned that their own judicially created exceptions to the statute have the power
to destroy Congress’ patent law, stating: “The Court has recognized, however,
that too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate
patent law. For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” (emphasis added). Id.
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what has been the intent of the Constitution and Congress for over
200 years. In so doing, for this latter part, this article will also draw
on and review the European Patent Convention and its view on the
patentability of diagnostic method claims in order to provide an
extraterritorial context and possible direction lawmakers may wish
to explore.
Part VI suggests ways in which this article might contribute to
the scholarly debate by articulating the proposition that abolishing
the non-statutory exceptions to patent eligibility laws under
Section 101 will modernize and simplify the rules governing U.S.
patent laws, and reverse the caustic effect of the new patent
eligibility legal framework on the medical diagnostics industry.
Such action would also bring back much sought-after certainty to
current U.S. patent law, and would thereby also harmonize this
feature of U.S. patent law with the patent laws of other industrialized
societies much akin to how Congress harmonized important aspects
of U.S. patent laws with patent laws of other industrialized countries
when it passed the monumental America Invents Act in 2013. In the
alternative, this part discusses how amendments to the existing
statute could achieve a similar outcome.
The enactment of America Invents Act in 2013 was a leap
forward and so too would be significant congressional action
concerning Section 101. This will have the knock-on effect of
returning our laws to once again encouraging and rewarding
entrepreneurial innovators, especially those operating in the
personalized medicine and medical diagnostics industries, to
develop and bring new biomedical technologies to the
marketplace. 35
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF
PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
The U.S. Constitution gives power to Congress to “promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
Since the U.S. Constitution mandates Congress to enact laws to “promote the
progress of science and the useful arts,” such action would be squarely within
Congress’ mandate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35
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writings and discoveries.” 36 Thus, the U.S. Constitution not only
grants Congress the power to create laws that promote the progress
of science, but it also associates inventors with discoveries. 37 Since
the power that Congress has is exclusive, only lawmakers decide the
legal mechanism by which they will promote the progress in science
and the useful arts. One way this can be done is to first define exactly
what kind of subject matter the country wishes to see progress in,
and then formulate laws that are tailored to promoting progress in
those subject matters listed. 38 The focus of this paper is the patent
eligibility statute under Section 101, with the ultimate question at
the heart of this debate being: “what kind of subject matter is eligible
for a patent?” 39
A. Legislative Development of Patent Eligibility Laws
In 1790, Congress passed a law for the first time to codify what
can and cannot be patent eligible subject matter. 40 Thomas Jefferson,
who first drafted a statute to “promote the progress of science and
useful arts,” 41 relied heavily on established English law that aimed
“to promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . by giving the
public at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing
invented, at as early a period as possible; having a due regard to the
rights of the inventor.” 42 Next came the Thomas Jefferson-authored
Patent Act of 1793, which repealed the Patent Act of 1790 and
largely embodied the ideology of older English law and ultimately
defined patent eligible subject matter to be “any new and useful
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (capitalization omitted).
See generally Sherry Knowles & Anthony Prosser, Unconstitutional
Application of 35 U.S.C. § 101 by the U.S. Supreme Court, 18 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 144 (2018).
38
Indisputably, nowadays, Patent Law is intractably tied to new technology
development and commercialization.
39
The U.S. Constitution excludes the word “patent,” but there is also no explicit
requirement for Congress to advance certain technologies to progress science.
40
Pub. L. No. 1-34, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
41
Id.
42
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829) (noting “it is obvious to the careful
inquirer, that many of the provisions of our Patent Act are derived from the
principles and practice which have prevailed in the construction of that of
England.”).
36
37

MAR. 2020]

Patent Eligibility of Disease Diagnosis

75

process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new or useful improvement thereof.” 43
Between 1793 and 1952, other Patent Acts were passed by
Congress, including the Patent Acts of 1794,44 1800, 45 1832, 46
1836, 47 1837, 48 1839, 49 1842, 50 1870, 51 and many more. Interestingly,
vis-à-vis the patent eligibility laws, during this 160-year period the
kind of subject matter eligible for patent protection remained largely
unchanged. From the 1950s to the present day, the key legislation
passed by Congress that affected patents were the 1952 Patent Act
and the recently enacted America Invents Act. Although the 1952
Act added certain definitions, neither the 1952 Patent Act nor the
recent America Invents Act changed the substance of patent
eligibility laws as they existed in the 1790s.
Thus, for approximately the last 230 years, from the 1790s until
today, the area of law affecting what subject matter is eligible for a
patent has remained largely unchanged. The current version of the
patent eligibility statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101, states:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title. 52

The inclusion of the words “invents” and “discovers” in the
statute has largely been deliberately consistent throughout the
statutory language. 53 The reason this is important is that the Supreme
Court in recent years has effectively ignored the word “discovers”
to suit their new interpretation of the statute. As an example, the
Supreme Court recently in Myriad stated that: “[g]roundbreaking,
innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the
Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793).
Pub. L. No. 3-58, 2 Stat. 393 (1794).
45
Pub. L. No. 6-25, 3 Stat. 37 (1800).
46
Pub. L. No. 22-162, 4 Stat. 559 (1832).
47
Pub. L. No. 24-357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
48
Pub. L. No. 24-409, 5 Stat. 191 (1837).
49
Pub. L. No. 25-292, 5 Stat. 353 (1839).
50
Pub. L. No. 27-288, 5 Stat. 543 (1842).
51
Pub. L. No. 41-230, 15 Stat. 198 (1870).
52
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (emphasis added).
53
Knowles & Prosser, supra note 37.
43
44
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§ 101 inquiry.” 54 And yet, the express wording of the Section 101
statute says otherwise: “whoever invents or discovers . . . .” 55
A key criticism of current patent eligibility laws, as articulated
under the Supreme Court’s recent Mayo decision, is that it imports
considerations of novelty of an invention under the patent eligible
subject matter deliberation. 56 In order to make this reasoning work,
the Supreme Court made statements that run directly against long
standing express statutory language by saying, for example, that just
by discovering something you do not necessarily satisfy the
Section 101 inquiry. 57 That is even though the long-standing
Section 101 statute expressly states that the inquiry is based on
someone inventing or discovering any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter.
Moreover, even after the Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory
patent eligible subject matters as “any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or
useful improvement thereof,” 58 the many Patent Acts that were
enacted in the ensuing 200 years decided to keep this express
language of the statute unchanged. Indeed, it is also somewhat
telling that when Thomas Jefferson authored the Patent Act of 1793,
he had in mind that “ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement.” 59 Thus, when the Supreme Court first created
exceptions to what the statute explicitly states is patent eligible
subject matter, and now their recent wholesale expansion of the
scope of these exceptions, it has caused a shockwave. These
exceptions run directly against not only long standing express
statutory language, but also against the implicit intent of Congress
to liberally encourage ingenuity, as Jefferson had intended.

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, 569 U.S. 579, 591 (2013).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (emphasis added).
56
See discussion infra Part IV.
57
Myriad, 569 U.S. at 591 (“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”).
58
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
59
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed.,
1903). See Knowles & Prosser, supra note 37 for a more detailed and thorough
discussion on the legislative history of § 101.
54
55
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The statutory intent is and has been for over 200 years to set a
low threshold to patent eligible subject matter. Indeed, the Supreme
Court itself decades ago recognized this when stating that this
includes “anything under the sun made by man.” 60 Yet, in direct
contrast to the express statutory language found in Section 101, its
legislative history and Congress’s intent, and past Supreme Court
precedent, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has evolved to now
put a very high bar on a previously low threshold Section 101
inquiry as to what subject matter is even eligible for a patent.
III.
THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM CONCERNING PATENT ELIGIBILITY LAWS
Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the
power “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.” 61 With this as the
backdrop, it may be counterintuitive to the non-patent scholar to
learn that even if an invention is found to be novel, to be nonobvious,
to have utility, and to meet all of the technical requirements for a
patent, a patent will still not issue unless, as a preliminary threshold
matter, the invention is directed to subject matter that the Patent Act,
under Section 101, has defined to be patent eligible subject matter. 62
Thus, this topic of patent eligibility is of fundamental importance
because of the direct nature in which it affects patent procurement
and enforceability, and ultimately the progress of technological
innovation in the United States.
A. 19th and 20th Century Decisions on Patent Eligible Subject
Matter
Le Roy v. Tatham 63 is the oldest of three key patent eligibility
cases handed down by the Supreme Court in the 19th century. A
quote that is used regularly by more recent cases from both the
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (capitalization omitted).
62
See generally PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (2019) (providing a discussion of the evolution of the
patentable subject matter doctrine).
63
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852).
60
61
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Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit referencing this decision is
that “a principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original
cause; a motive; and these cannot be patented, as no one can claim
in either of them an exclusive right.” 64 In that same decade, the
telegraph case O’Reilly v. Morse 65 was decided. There, Morse sued
O’Reilly for patent infringement based on a technology that allowed
for long distance transmission of a telegraph signal. 66 The Supreme
Court noted that Morse’s broad patent claim was not enabled
because he enabled only electromagnetic repeaters. 67 Drawing from
the older Neilson decision from England, 68 the Supreme Court
concluded that Morse’s patent claim addresses all possible
applications of a physical principle, not a specific implementation
of the principle. Thus, the Court found the patent claim to be
ineligible subject matter.
The third notable case from the 19th century is Tilghman v.
Proctor. 69 In Tilghman, the claim was to a method of making fatty
acids and glycerin using hot water at a high pressure. 70 The Supreme
Court, drawing on their earlier decision in Morse, clarified that a
patent for a process is different from a patent to a scientific principle
and that a scientific principle itself is not patent eligible subject
matter. 71 The Court explained that a patent claim fails if it is not a
claim to a particular machine, or a claim to a specific process for
utilizing a scientific principle. 72
In the 20th century, the Supreme Court decided three key cases
related to patent eligibility in the 1970s, namely Gottschalk v.
Id. at 175.
O’Reilly v Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
66
Id.
67
“Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts
of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of
my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current,
which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing
intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application
of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.” Id.
68
Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841).
69
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 726–29.
72
Id.
64
65
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Benson, 73 Parker v. Flook, 74 and Diamond v. Diehr. 75 For the latter
half of the 20th century, these three cases provided much of the
framework for the Court’s view on patent eligibility requirement
under Section 101. That framework fundamentally changed when
the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of patent eligibility cases within
a three-year period between 2012–2014, 76 discussed infra in part IV.
In Benson, 77 the Supreme Court decided on the patentability of
software, holding that a patent on a method for converting numbers
from one binary format to another format was invalid. Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, articulated that “the mathematical
formula involved here has no substantial practical application except
in connection with a digital computer.” 78 Mathematical algorithms,
according to the Court, were not eligible subject matter for patent
protection because if a patent were allowed it would “wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a
patent on the algorithm itself.” 79 Although the Court had earlier
distinguished scientific principles, such as laws of nature, from the
practical application of those scientific principles, 80 the Benson
decision was the first instance in which the Supreme Court described
abstract ideas as a separate category of patent ineligible subject
matter. 81
Thus, after Benson, in contrast to an invention, algorithms were
treated as laws of nature and the algorithm itself being treated as
nothing more than a discovery of a fundamental truth and therefore
making it ineligible subject matter for patenting. What to this day
remains confusing about Benson is that although the Court found a
mathematical algorithm (computer program) to be patent ineligible
subject matter, the Court suggested it would allow a patent that
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
75
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
76
The Mayo/Myriad/Alice patent eligibility trio of cases from the Supreme
Court, decided in 2012–14.
77
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
81
Benson, 409 U.S. at 63.
73
74
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covered a “program servicing a computer.” 82 This is especially
resonant since a computer program or software is nothing more than
a complex mathematical algorithm, instructing a computer to solve
a problem (thus akin to “servicing a computer” recited in Benson).
In Flook, a decision that was effectively overruled by the Court
in two subsequent decisions, Chakrabarty and Diehr, the patent
application was for a method of updating alarm limits.83 Flook’s
method was identical to previous systems, but for a mathematical
algorithm. 84 Here, the Flook Court compared its own ruling in
Benson some six years earlier to the specific application of the
algorithm in Flook for catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons. 85
Relying on the English Neilson 86 decision and its progeny, the Court
found Flook’s patent claim did not contain patent eligible subject
matter because it was a “principle” or a “law of nature.” 87
The Supreme Court in Flook took the controversial position and
focused on the “inventive concept” 88 and not on the patent claim “as
a whole.” 89 The Court opined that “even though a phenomenon of
nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive
application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the
discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless
there is some other inventive concept in its application.” 90
Interestingly, although Chakrabarty 91 and Diehr 92 effectively
overruled Flook later in the 20th century, the Flook holding and
reasoning is making a strong revival as evidenced by how favorably
recent Supreme Court decisions in Bilski in 2010 and Mayo in 2012
both looked upon and aligned with the Flook decision. Yet, in many

Id. at 71.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 588–90.
86
Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841).
87
Flook, 437 U.S. at 592.
88
Id. at 594.
89
Id.
90
Id. (emphasis added).
91
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
92
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186–87 (1981).
82
83
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instances the lower courts continue to ignore Flook and follow Diehr
and Chakrabarty, and the recently decided Mayo and Alice cases. 93
The Supreme Court decided Diehr three years after Flook.
Diehr’s invention used a computer program to determine the curing
time for rubber, allowing better precision molded rubber products to
be made. 94 The invention included a software algorithm to run a
molding press, thereby achieving a specific result of curing rubber.
The Court held that the computer program that executed the physical
method was patent eligible subject matter, noting that although
software algorithms could not be patented, the mere presence of a
software element did not make an otherwise patent-eligible machine
or process an ineligible subject matter for patenting.
Unlike the method claims in Benson and Flook, the Diehr Court
found the method to be patent eligible subject matter because the
claims did not “foreclose from others the use of that equation in
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process” 95
when they were “considered as a whole.” 96 Thus, the Diehr Court
focused on the implementation of the algorithm and how it applied
in the method; more particularly, whether, as the Court noted, the
mathematical algorithm “transform[s] and reduces . . . an article ‘to
a different state or thing.’” 97 The Supreme Court reiterated its
position in Diehr that abstract mathematical formulas are patent
ineligible subject matter, and that using such a formula in a physical
machine or process is different to a claim solely to the algorithm
itself.
Interestingly, from each of Benson, Flook and Diehr decisions
spanning a decade that focused on patent eligibility, a different
interpretation emerged of the statutory law governing patent eligible
subject matter, namely Section 101. However, from the most
recently decided Diehr decision of this trilogy of cases, one could
adduce the Court as highlighting two traditional understandings
See infra Part IV.
U.S. Patent No. 4,344,142, directed to “Direct digital control of rubber
molding presses” (filed Aug. 6, 1975).
95
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
96
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
97
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
93
94

82

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 63

concerning patent eligibility. First, that abstract principles are not
patent eligible, even though practical applications of those
principles are patent eligible, 98 and second that related issues,
novelty, obviousness or inventiveness should play no role in
determining patent eligibility under Section 101. 99
Between 1981, when the Diehr decision was handed down, to
2010, the Supreme Court did not address a patent eligibility issue
under Section 101. This resulted in stakeholders and patent
professionals believing that the patent eligibility laws articulated in
those cases had generally settled and could be relied upon. During
this thirty-year period, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
interpreting the patent eligible subject matter under Section 101,
began to interpret and rely on Diehr to broaden the scope of patent
eligible subject matter. For example, in the years between the Diehr
decision in 1981 and the Bilski decision in 2010, the Federal Circuit
found business method claims that were previously patent ineligible
subject matter were now patent eligible if the method achieved a
“useful, concrete and tangible result.” 100
This expansive radical move by the Federal Circuit in State
Street 101 was eyebrow raising and although some commentators saw
this as demonstrating the Federal Circuit’s ability to be nimble and
flexible in the era of newly emerging innovative technologies and
Id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of
patent protection.”); Id. at 191 (“We recognize, of course, that when a claim
recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature),
an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for
that formula in the abstract.”).
99
Id. at 188–89 (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of
the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of
a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”).
100
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
101
State Street overruled the Freeman-Walter-Abele Test, noting it had “little,
if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject matter.” Id.
at 1374. Yet, the court in State Street set forth a “‘useful, concrete, and tangible
result[s]’” test. Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544). The Supreme
Court never accepted this test, questioning its viability. See Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006).
98
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all the while in keeping with the Supreme Court’s Diehr decision,
the reality of what transpired was completely different.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in State Street
to correct the mistake. 102 Therefore, what transpired after the Federal
Circuit’s expansion of what constitutes patent eligible subject matter
in State Street was a surge in a plethora of business method patent
applications on anything from offering legal services to even
services aimed at booking lavatories. Relying on the Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s Diehr decision, the
majority of IP stakeholders, between the 1999 State Street decision
and 2010, regarded patent eligibility under Section 101 to be a
“coarse filter” 103 through which the vast majority of patent
applications pass with very few patent office rejections. Issues
related to patent eligibility were simply not something to give too
much attention to during that period.
Yet, all this fundamentally changed when the Supreme Court,
silent for thirty years on patent eligibility, rendered four patent
eligibility decisions spanning 2010−2014, with Bilski being the
first. 104
B. 21st Century Decisions on Patent Eligible Subject Matter:
Expansion of the Judicially Created Exceptions
The Supreme Court decided Bilski some thirty years after their
Diehr decision. The patent claims at issue in Bilski 105 centered on a
method for hedging risk in trading commodities. The Federal Circuit
heard the case en banc, perhaps wishing to amend their State Street
decision which had opened the flood gates for patenting a plethora
of ways of doing business. The Federal Circuit agreed with the
USPTO, and in tune with Supreme Court precedent, held that such
methods can be patented only if they are implemented by a machine
or transform something into a new or different thing. The Court
found Bilski’s method was not patent eligible subject matter because
“transformations or manipulations of . . . business risks or other such
See State Street Bank and Trust Co., 525 U.S. 1093 (denying petition for
writ of certiorari).
103
Res. Corp. Tech. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
104
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
105
Id.
102
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abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical
objects or substances.” 106 Although the Federal Circuit reaffirmed
that business methods are still patentable, the Court rejected their
own “useful concrete and tangible result” test in State Street on the
basis that their earlier State Street decision had resulted in patents
being issued on everyday activities that had no connection to
innovation in new technologies. 107
In Bilski, the Supreme Court issued a total of three opinions,
consisting of a plurality opinion for the Court and two concurring
opinions. In its plurality opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Federal Circuit’s rejection of Bilski’s patent claims, but for different
reasons than the lower court. The Supreme Court in Bilski held that
the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test is merely “a
useful and important clue, an investigative tool” for patentability but
not the sole or exclusive test for identifying patentable methods.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s failure to provide a bright-line workable
Section 101 framework effectively forced lower courts to decipher
what is and is not patent eligible subject matter without a definitive
test. 108
The uncertainty of the Bilski decision did not last long because
two years after deciding Bilski, the Supreme Court decided the
seminal Mayo decision. In Mayo, the technology related to medical
diagnostic technologies. Here, the Court used their Mayo decision 109
to fundamentally and radically change the scope of patent eligible
subject matter, thereby substantially changing the foundation for
how stakeholders in the personalized medicine, biotechnology and
medical diagnostic fields would come to view the protectability of
new developments and innovation in these technologies.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 959–60 (citing State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
108
Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer
to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity
to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN L. REV. 1289, 1304
(2011) (stating “the Supreme Court’s methodology and analysis for determining
whether a process falls within the scope of patentable subject matter could hardly
be more opaque.”).
109
See discussion infra Part IV.b.
106
107
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PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSTIC
TECHNOLOGIES

A. A Primer on Biotechnology, Personalized Medicine & Medical
Diagnostic Technologies
To give context to how the recent changes to patent eligibility
laws discussed in this Article affect newly emerging technologies, I
here focus on the field of personalized medicine, medical
diagnostics and innovative technologies grounded in the field of
biotechnology. One of the primary reasons why innovation in the
biotechnology field is sensitive to and has been affected by the
recent changes in patent eligibility laws is because, at its core, there
is a close relationship between inventions in the biotechnological
field, including those in medical diagnostics, and the laws of nature
and natural phenomena they rely on. Thus, in order for the nontechnical reader to appreciate the interplay between technology and
law in this context, in this section, a brief overview of the medical
technology is discussed.
Personalized medicine is an emerging model for treating and
preventing disease that takes into account each person’s genetic
variations, environment, and lifestyle. Medical diagnostic tests now
allow for the use of a patient’s unique genetic profile to diagnose
disease, 110 identify risk factors for genetic transmission of
diseases, 111 assess possible future likelihood of a disease
occurring, 112 and also intelligence in devising treatments. 113 Not long
after the seminal Mayo decision, discussed in detail below, and
recognizing this buzz around the field of personalized medicine and
the emerging medical diagnostic technologies it relies upon,
See,
e.g.,
Testing
For
CF,
CYSTIC
FIBROSIS
FOUND.,
https://www.cff.org/What-is-CF/Testing [perma.cc/42NG-3NMX] (last visited
Feb. 5, 2020).
111
See, e.g., Learning About Tay-Sachs Disease, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES.
INST. (Mar. 17, 2011), https://www.genome.gov/10001220 [perma.cc/U347UGFC].
112
Genetic Testing FAQ, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/FAQ/Genetic-Testing [perma.cc/6GRN-J3RZ] (last
visited Dec. 20, 2019).
113
Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized
Medicine, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 301, 301 (2010).
110
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President Obama announced in his 2015 State of the Union address
that the U.S. government would fund an “All of US” initiative 114 to
enroll at least one million people into a personalized medicine
initiative 115 in which ten years of medical information is captured
and shared. 116
The idea behind President Obama’s initiative has been to use the
power of the collective data to better understand the biology and
pathogenesis of a disease and be in a position to provide better
patient care and outcomes. Various technologies developed over the
last decade have made such an initiative possible, including for
example low cost high throughput DNA sequencing technologies 117
and other genome-based technology platforms used to classify
certain disease stages using medical diagnostic tests to predict the
likelihood of future clinical outcomes, as prognostic tests.
The novel concept behind personalized medicine is to tailor
therapeutic strategies, be they for treatment or prevention purposes,
based on an individual’s genomic and proteomic profile. This
rapidly evolving approach to medicine is proving to be
transformational for medical interventions. With the ever increasing
stratification of patients based on their molecular makeup, for
example looking for mutations present in certain genes which would
indicate a drug would not work on a given patient, and government
support of initiatives such as the “All of US” mentioned previously,
National Institutes of Health, All of Us Research Program,
https://allofus.nih.gov/ [perma.cc/RS8V-K6NE] (last visited Dec. 12, 2019).
115
Digital Health Market Size Worth $509.2 Billion By 2025, GRAND VIEW
RES. (May 2019), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/globaldigital-health-market [perma.cc/7XD7-5WFD] (last visited Dec. 12, 2019).
116
In 2015, President Obama announced in his State of the Union address the
launch of the Precision Medicine Initiative, a bold new way to revolutionize how
we improve health and treat disease (“Doctors have always recognized that every
patient is unique, and doctors have always tried to tailor their treatments as best
they can to individuals. You can match a blood transfusion to a blood type - that
was an important discovery. What if matching a cancer cure to our genetic code
was just as easy, just as standard? What if figuring out the right dose of medicine
was as simple as taking our temperature?”). President Barack Obama, State of the
Union Address (Jan. 30, 2015).
117
The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES.
INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/27565109/the-cost-of-sequencing-a-humangenome/ [https://perma.cc/VY2H-ZSLL] (last updated Oct. 30, 2019).
114
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physicians are becoming increasingly more able to better tailor
treatment strategies on a case by case basis. It is thus likely that the
rise in the development of emerging new medical diagnostic
technologies within the era of personalized medicine will result in
the ability of physicians to select drugs based on a patient’s
underlying genetic makeup. Such tests will allow for periodic
molecular profiling of people to move their health care strategies
from acute intervention and disease management to proactive
management of disease risk and prevention.
The success of personalized medicine hinges on new and
innovative medical diagnostic technologies, involving for example
genomic testing technologies. 118 Indeed, medical diagnostic
technologies already play an important role in the practice of
medicine, impacting as high as 70 percent of health care decision
making. 119 The concept is to use such medical diagnostic tests in the
field of personalized medicine, such that a patient receives the right
drug at the right dose at the right time.120 For example, in medicine,
pharmacogenomics, a field that is highly relevant to personalized
medicine, is increasingly being used in clinics to study genetic
information of an individual before making drug choice and drug
dose decisions. 121 Different mutations in certain genes can present
similarly in patients, and yet each patient will only respond to
different treatments (drug efficacy between patients with same gene
mutation being different). 122
Medical diagnostic tests are generally used in clinical medical
practice to identify the patient’s condition and therefore provide for
early and effective treatment of the particular disease at hand. Being
able to provide an accurate medical diagnostic test that has a small
Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized
Medicine, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 301, 301 (2010).
119
KEWAL K. JAIN, TEXTBOOK OF PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 91–96 (2d. ed.
2015).
120
Wolfgang Sadée & Zunyan Dai, Pharmacogenetics/Genomics and
Personalized Medicine, 14 HUM. MOL. GENET. 207 (2005).
121
What is Pharmacogenomics?, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/genomicresearch/pharmacogenomics
[https://perma.cc/X5TQ-GZZ7].
122
Williams E. Evans & Howard L. McLeod, Pharmacogenomics: Drug
Disposition, Drug Targets, and Side Effects, 348 N. ENG. J. MED. 538, 546 (2003).
118
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probability of missing a diagnosis, or making an error in the
diagnosis, or a making a delayed diagnosis are all crucial features in
the management of a disease. 123 These medical diagnostic tests help
in better understanding a patient’s condition, predict clinical
outcomes, select personalized medical treatment protocols, and to
determine if a treatment is working. Thus, the commercialization of
molecular medical diagnostic technologies has greatly expanded the
field of pharmacogenetics, the application of which is now
increasingly adopted in personalized medicine to address a patient’s
condition. 124
In a medical clinical setting, such medical diagnostic tests can
be used to confirm/exclude, triage, monitor, prognose, or screen for
a particular marker or condition. For example, a diagnostic test can
confirm or exclude that a patient has a particular disease, or a test
could be used repeatedly to monitor how effective a concurrent
treatment is, or assess the progression and/or outcome of a disease,
or screen for a disease condition in people who do not show
outwardly any symptoms. Thus, the breadth and impact of the
medical diagnostic field in being able to provide better patient care
is enormous. Having a robust, accurate and precise medical
diagnostic test that is readily repeatable and reproducible is a
significant technological leap forward in the process of managing
health outcomes in patients. In this emerging new technological era
of advanced medical diagnostic technologies, the vision is to
provide “the right drug, with the right dose at the right time to the
right patient.” 125 The question is: how does the new patent eligibility
law interplay with innovations in this personalized medicine and
medical diagnostics field?

G. D. Schiff et al., Diagnostic Error in Medicine: Analysis of 583 PhysicianReported Errors, 169 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1881–87 (2009).
124
Id.
125
Id.
123
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B. Patent Eligibility of Diagnostic Method Claims: The Problem
with Mayo Expanding the “Law of Nature” Exception and
Myriad Expanding the “Natural Phenomena” Exception
Protecting medical diagnostic technologies by permitting their
patenting is a desirable outcome, albeit one can understand the need
to proceed with caution when establishing an overly inclusive
system that allows a monopoly on such medical techniques. Medical
diagnostic technologies can be used to capture a number of practical
applications, including testing to identify certain characteristics that
can then help deliver better health outcomes in patients.
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Mayo and Myriad,
discussed infra, are two seminal decisions addressing the patent
eligibility question of biotechnological innovations, including
patent claims to emerging medical diagnostic technologies. After
deciding Bilski in 2010, discussed supra, the Supreme Court turned
its attention to a subcategory of innovative and financially lucrative
technologies within the biomedical sector, namely the patent
eligibility of emerging medical diagnostic technologies. In three
short years, the Supreme Court decided three patent eligibility cases
that would significantly impact this industry, starting with the
decision in Mayo. 126 Mayo showcased the Court’s ill-advised radical
shift away from its own precedent and away from the express
language in the statute.
The Supreme Court created judicial exceptions to statutory
language primarily to prevent patents from monopolizing “the basic
tools of scientific and technological work.” 127 The context for the
Supreme Court’s recent radical shift on this issue of patent eligibility
is likely a result of several converging factors, including the fact that
many on the patent bar had voiced an opinion that as a direct result
of the Federal Circuit’s expansive interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s Diehr decision over many years, a glut of superfluous low
quality patents had issued and that this ultimately had a chilling
effect on the advancement of technological innovation in America.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576,
589 (2013)).
126
127
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Some scholars have argued that well above 90 percent of patents
are never actually commercialized in any way. 128 Although the lack
of commercialization of the majority of patents does not necessarily
damage the structure of incentives and rewards in the United States’
patent system by themselves, the recent bundling of these
superfluous patents and their assertion by non-practicing entities
(“NPEs”) against companies producing products has become cause
for concern. 129 Moreover, the 2016 Federal Trade Commission
report on Patent Assertion Entities also concluded that the high
number of low quality patents and their assertion by NPEs is a
nuisance business model. 130 Further still, the USPTO has faced
criticism for enabling this landscape by granting poor quality
patents, with a government report, issued by GAO during the same
time as the Supreme Court decisions analyzed herein, specifically
pointing out that a glut of poor quality issued patents was hurting
the patent ecosystem, 131 and yet others highlighting that low quality

128
Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. FIN. 250, 264
(2013) (“The vast majority of patents have never directly earned a return for the
patent holder. Estimates suggest that the number is well above 90%.”); see also
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA L. REV.
1, 5 (2005) (estimating that less than 5 percent of patents hold any value).
129
Id. at 254, 267–68 (“We need a mechanism for restraining inappropriate use
of intellectual property and for signaling the difference between the acceptable
pursuit of a return from your intellectual property and the inappropriate
oppression of others, using the legal system and societally granted privileges as a
weapon.”); see also Mark A. Lemley & Robin Feldman, Is Patent Enforcement
Efficient?, 98 B.U. L. REV. 649, 658 (2018).
130
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC
STUDY 8 (2016) (“Ninety-three percent of reported Litigation [Patent Assertion
Entity] licenses followed a lawsuit against the eventual licensee and 77% were
valued at less than the estimated cost of defending a patent lawsuit through the
end of discovery—a threshold below which litigation settlements might be
considered nuisance value.”).
131
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 32 (2013) (“The prevalence
of low quality patents was driving recent increases in litigation more than PME
suits.”).
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patents in the biotechnology and medical diagnostic industries
helped push up drug prices and cause public outrage. 132
i.

Mayo and Expanding the “Law of Nature” Exception
It is into this context that the first of the Mayo trilogy of cases
was born, the ultimate result of which has been to make it much
harder to obtain a patent. In Mayo, the Supreme Court drew on old
case law, including from an old English case Neilson, 133 as well as
from its own precedent in O’Reilly 134 and Funk Brothers 135 to
propose that the real test for determining patent eligible subject
matter under Section 101 was not whether the patent claim had a
practical application, but rather whether the patent claim had an
inventive application of an underlying principle. 136 As is explained
infra, 137 this is seen by many as a radical shift and damaging to
several technological industries, including being especially
damaging to emerging medical diagnostics technologies.
In Mayo, the invention was directed to a method for optimizing
the efficacy of a drug given to a patient. In particular, the patent
claimed methods for calibrating the dosage of thiopurine drugs used
for treating certain autoimmune diseases, including gastrointestinal
disorders. 138 In effect, the method involved the doctor administering
Robin Feldman et al., Empirical Evidence of Drug Pricing Games - A
Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39, 42 (2017)
(“Anecdotal evidence has percolated in recent years about new forms of strategic
behavior designed to keep drug prices artificially inflated by blocking generic
entry.”).
133
Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841).
134
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
135
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). In this
case, the inventor did not create the strains of bacteria and the strains that were
central to this invention, and therefore were ‘phenomena of nature’ and
unpatentable. While mixing different strains into one product was an application
of the natural phenomena, the invention was deemed unpatentable subject matter
because it amounted to no more than an alternate way to package the product.
136
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–
73 (2012) (emphasis added).
137
See discussion infra Part IV.b.ii.
138
The independent patent claim at issue in Mayo recited a method of
optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder;
132
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the drug, waiting for the drug to be metabolized by the body, and
then taking a blood sample to see if the metabolite of the drug was
high or low. Based on this reading of the metabolite level, a decision
was then made whether to administer more or less of the drug to the
patient. Thus, the patent claimed measuring metabolites of the drug
to optimize therapeutic efficacy and at the same time minimize
toxicity and side effects.
However, the Supreme Court found Mayo’s patent claims 139 “do
nothing more than simply describe the natural relationships between
concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood
that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause
harm,” 140 stating further that correlating levels of a drug metabolite
in blood with either an overdose or underdose of the drug is
ineligible subject matter for patenting because it is a law of nature. 141
The Mayo Court went on to articulate its belief that, when a method
involves a natural law or abstract idea, it must also contain “an
inventive concept,” which the Court defined as “other elements or a
combination of elements . . . sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural
law itself.” 142 The Court compared the Mayo patent claim to its past
precedent in both Diehr 143 and Flook, 144 concluding that the patent
claims provide mere “instructions” and that “because methods for
and (b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine
less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase
the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and wherein
the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells
indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered
to said subject.
139
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 77 (the Court explaining that “The relation is a consequence of the
ways in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body—entirely
natural processes. And so a patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a
natural law.”).
142
Id. at 72–73 (emphasis added).
143
See Diamond v. Deihr, 450 U.S. 175, 192–93 (1981) (holding subject matter
patent eligible).
144
See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (holding subject matter patent
ineligible).
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making such determinations were well known in the art, this step
simply tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists in the field.
Such activity is normally not sufficient to transform an unpatentable
law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law.” 145
Thus, in Mayo, the Supreme Court articulated that the test for
determining patent eligible subject matter under Section 101 was
not whether the patent claim had a practical application, but rather
whether the patent claim had an inventive application of an
underlying principle. The U.S. government had filed an amicus
curiae in this case, advising the Court to adhere to the statutory
language and to keep a low threshold for determining patent eligible
subject matter, arguing that the higher bars to patentability in other
parts of the Patent Act are best suited for the task for determining
patentability, 146 namely novelty under Section 102 and obviousness
under Section 103. Yet, the Supreme Court decided against the
government’s position and by articulating their new position in
Mayo, the Supreme Court effectively vastly increased the scope of
the Court’s own created exceptions to the express language of the
statute that outlines what is and is not patent eligible subject matter.
ii.

Myriad and Expanding the “Product of Nature” Exception
Just one year after the controversial Mayo decision, the Supreme
Court decided another patent eligibility case related to biomedical
technologies when it decided Myriad. 147 In Myriad, the Court
addressed the controversial issue of whether certain genomic
inventions were patent eligible subject matter. The Supreme Court
held that genomic DNA was subject matter that is ineligible for a
patent under Section 101 because of the “product of nature” judicial
exception. Prior to this decision, courts took the view that such
claims would be patent eligible if the claim included significant
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 67.
Patentability and patent eligibility are two different concepts, with the
former focusing most on legal issues of novelty (Section 102 of the Patent Act)
and non-obviousness (Section 103 of the Patent Act) and the latter focusing on
patent eligible subject matter (Section 101 of the Patent Act).
147
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576
(2013).
145
146
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artificial changes made to the product of nature, perhaps by
purifying, isolating or altering in any way.
This “product of nature” exclusion to patent eligible subject
matter had previously denied patent protection to plant extracts, 148
naturally occurring metals, 149 and novel mixtures of existing
bacteria. 150 Yet, the courts created a significant exception allowing
an isolated and purified natural product to be patent-eligible. For
example, Judge Learned Hand in Parke-Davis held that isolating
and purifying adrenaline from animal glands made it patent eligible
subject matter despite it being a natural product. 151 However, the
contours of this exception all changed with the arrival of Myriad.
Myriad followed just one year after the alarming Mayo decision.
In Myriad, the overarching technology related to the eligibility of
isolated DNA sequences, namely BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes,
methods for predicting the likelihood of cancer developing in a
patient by examining mutations in those genes, and also methods to
identify anti-cancer drugs using the isolated DNA sequences. 152 At
its core, Myriad involved the discovery that certain mutations in
these two genes are associated with a predisposition of a patient to
developing breast and ovarian cancer. 153 Myriad’s invention
represented a significant advancement in cancer treatment. Yet, as
soon as Myriad began its commercialization strategy, there was
widespread public outcry. 154 A group of medical professionals,
Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123.
Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir. 1928).
150
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
151
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1911).
152
See patent claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 20 of U.S. Patent No.: 5,747,282; and
patent claims 1, 6, and 7 of U.S. Patent No.: 5,837,492.
153
For example, claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 recites: “An isolated
DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the [following]
amino acid sequence . . . .” For the sake of transparency, the author of this article
was a member of the IP law group of a large international law firm in NYC that
developed the patent portfolio for this innovator concerning their breast and
ovarian cancer technology.
154
E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy
38,
S41,
S43
(2010),
Storm,
12
GENETICS IN MEDICINES
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3037261/
[https://perma.cc/QV7T-QCQX].
148
149
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joined by other entities, sued Myriad and sought to invalidate its
patents on Section 101 grounds, arguing that isolated DNA is a
product of nature and therefore is patent ineligible subject matter. 155
On appeal, ignoring three decades of practice to the contrary, the
Supreme Court held that while claims directed specifically to the
complementary DNA (cDNA) for the breast cancer genes, BRCA1
and BRCA2, were patent-eligible, claims to an isolated nucleic acid
encoding the BRCA1/2 genes were not patent eligible because they
are “a natural product.” 156 Consistent with its previous decision in
Mayo, in which the court expanded its “law of nature” exception 157
to patent eligible subject matter, in Myriad the Supreme Court
expanded its “product of nature” exception 158 to patent eligible
subject matter under Section 101. 159 With this Myriad decision, the
Supreme Court reversed thirty years of USPTO practice of granting
exactly that kind of patent for isolated nucleic acid sequences that
now the Court was deciding was ineligible subject matter. To
highlight the weight of this decision, the USPTO had issued over
50,000 U.S. patents relating in part to DNA 160 and all of these were
now subject to this seesaw reversal because of this expansion to the
“natural product” exception under this newly decided expansive
Myriad decision.
Immediately following Myriad, the Federal Circuit began to
invalidate patents en masse. 161 The problem with expanding the
scope of the judicially created exceptions to statutory patent eligible
subject matter can be seen by assessing, for example, the effect of
this radical change in patent law on the medical diagnostic
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702
F. Supp. 2d 181, 186–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
156
Id.; see generally Evan H. Tallmadge, Patenting Natural Products After
Myriad, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569 (2017).
157
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
158
In this paper, “product of nature” and “natural phenomena” are used
interchangeably.
159
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 569 U.S. 576,
579 (2013).
160
Guyan Lian, Molecules or Carriers of Biological Information: A Chemist’s
Perspective on the Patentability of Isolated Genes, 22 ALBANY L.J. SCI. AND
TECH. 133 (2012).
161
Genetic Tech. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F. 3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
155
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technologies. In one example, when Professor Dennis Lo and
colleagues at Oxford University discovered that cell-free fetal DNA
(cffDNA) could be detected in the plasma and serum of pregnant
women, they obtained U.S., European and Australian patents for
their novel methods of detecting this cffDNA using standard
techniques. 162 The center piece of this new medical diagnostic
technology was the ability to now more accurately and less
invasively detect abnormalities and characteristics of unborn
children by taking a simple blood test from the pregnant mother,
without having to risk complications to the unborn fetus and
pregnant mother by inserting a needle into the mother’s uterus and
puncturing the amniotic sac by amniocentesis to take a sample of
amniotic fluid for further testing. 163 In the U.S., the Federal Circuit
in Ariosa invalidated claims for these non-invasive methods of
detecting cffDNA from a blood sample of a pregnant woman. 164
According to the court, the only new and useful subject matter in the
method “was the discovery of the presence of cffDNA in maternal
plasma or serum.” 165 In contrast to the legal position in the United
States, this same technology, as will be discussed further infra, 166
was recently found to be patent eligible subject matter by both the
High Courts of the United Kingdom and also Australia. 167
Judge Linn indicated that Ariosa “represents the consequence—
perhaps unintended—of that broad language in [Mayo] excluding a
meritorious invention from the patent protection it deserves.” 168
Indeed, he indicated that he concurred “only because” he was bound
by the breadth of Mayo. 169 Moreover, once a hearing en banc was
denied in Ariosa, several Judges on the Federal Circuit also used the
opportunity to express concern that such discoveries were not able
to overcome the Supreme Court’s very high new bar to what the
See Y. M. Dennis Lo et al., Presence of Fetal DNA in Maternal Plasma and
Serum, 350 THE LANCET 485 (1997).
163
Id.
164
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
165
Id. at 1377
166
See discussion infra Part VI.b.
167
See Part VI.b on harmonizing patent eligibility laws.
168
Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring).
169
Id.
162
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Court unilaterally had opined is and is not patent eligible subject
matter. For example, Judge Lourie stated that “it is unsound to have
a rule that takes inventions of this nature out of the realm of patenteligibility.” 170 Similarly, Judge Dyk contended that “we are bound
by the language of Mayo, and any further guidance must come from
the Supreme Court.” 171 On appeal, the Supreme Court passed on the
opportunity to correct its decision in Mayo by denying certiorari in
Ariosa in 2016, a decision that disappointed many observers because
even though there were 23 amicus briefs filed encouraging the Court
to grant certiorari in Ariosa, the Supreme Court did not even ask the
Solicitor General’s opinion. 172
Some scholars have argued that the impact of Myriad raises
serious questions about the patent eligibility of biotechnological
products, including diagnostic methods. 173 However, other scholars
have disagreed, at least in regards to the extent to which the Myriad
decision upends the biotechnological sector. 174 What most scholars
agree with is that the Mayo decision was inelegantly decided and
poses a serious threat to the biotechnology industry. 175
170
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. 809 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Lourie, J., concurring).
171
Id. (Dyk, J., concurring).
172
Albeit, that stance may be changing since the Supreme Court recently asked
for the Solicitor General’s decision on two patent eligibility appeals currently
pending before the Court. Currently pending opportunities for the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari include in Berkheimer, Vanda, and Athena Diagnostics. It
remains to be seen; it is interesting that this time, unlike in Ariosa, the Supreme
Court has indeed invited the Solicitor General to submit a brief in both Berkheimer
and in Vanda; for Athena Diagnostics, a petition for certiorari is expected to be
filed within weeks.
173
Robert Schwartz & Timo Minssen, Life After Myriad: The Uncertain Future
of Patenting Biomedical Innovation and Personalised Medicine in an
International Context, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 189–241 (2015).
174
Christopher M. Holman, Mayo, Myriad, and the Future of Innovation in
Molecular Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 639
(2014).
175
INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PATENT
ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017),
http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/20170207_IPO-101-TFProposed-Amendments-and-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4MW-G24Z] (stating
that recent decisions “have dramatically narrowed the scope of patent protection

98

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 63

One year after its Myriad decision, came Alice. 176 In Alice, the
Supreme Court considered the patentability of a computerimplemented financial trading exchange system. 177 Here, the
Supreme Court underlined its two-part test for identifying patent
ineligible subject matter. 178 First, a claim is analyzed to see if any of
the exceptions to the statute apply. 179 If so, then the patent claim is
reviewed to determine whether the claim recites additional elements
that transform the claim into a patent-eligible application of any of
those three exceptions to the statute. 180 In this second step of the test,
it is necessary to determine whether the claim incorporates an
“inventive concept” that amounts to more than merely applying the
law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea to a particular
technological environment. 181 The Court determined that the method
claims in Alice were drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated
settlement, and that this amounted to nothing more than
implementation of an abstract idea on a computer. 182
Alice thus confirms that Mayo’s test should be used to determine
patent eligibility questions under Section 101, namely that it is not
whether a patent claim has a practical application, but rather
whether it has an inventive application of an underlying principle. 183
The Alice decision underscored the Court’s concern with
preemption, recognizing that abstract ideas are not patentable
because granting a monopoly to an abstract idea would stifle
innovation. 184 Thus, a claim that recites an abstract idea must include
“additional features” that amount to an “inventive concept” to be

for life sciences and software technology by significantly expanding the
judicially-created exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter”).
176
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
177
Id. at 208.
178
Id. at 217–18.
179
Id. at 218.
180
Id. at 221.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 225.
183
Id. at 222.
184
Id. at 216.
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patent eligible subject matter. 185 Alice also confirms that Mayo’s
two-step analysis should be applied to all types of claims. 186
In Mayo 187 and Alice, 188 the Supreme Court thus adopted a twostep test for determining patent-eligibility under Section 101, giving
rise to the expansion of the Supreme Court created exceptions to
what is patent eligible subject matter. These exceptions are
exceptions to the four categories of subject matter explicitly listed
in the Section 101 statute as being patent eligible. 189 That is, even if
an invention falls within one of the four categories of patent eligible
subject matter under the statute, it can still be found to be ineligible
subject matter because of the Supreme Court-created exceptions to
this statutory language. Under this new Mayo/Alice two step test,
one begins with determining whether the claimed invention is to one
of the four statutory categories. 190 If not, to qualify for patent eligible
subject matter, the patent claim must not be directed to a judicial
exception unless the claim as a whole includes additional limitations
amounting to significantly more than the exception. 191
This new Mayo/Alice test has been very difficult for patent
stakeholders, including examiners, inventors, patent owners, patent
lawyers and judges alike, to implement and/or interpret because it
remains unclear what the boundaries of Section 101 are. 192 As the IP
Id. at 221.
Id. at 216.
187
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
188
Alice, 573 U.S. at 208.
189
The current version of the patent eligibility statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018),
states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.”
190
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18; see Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77; see also 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2018).
191
See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72.
192
See Synchronoss Techs., Inc. v. Dropbox Inc., No. 16-cv-00119-HSG (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 22, 2016) (“This Court agrees with those judges who have observed that
even post-Enfish, the Mayo/Alice test provides limited practical guidance for
distinguishing software and computer patents that are valid under § 101 from
those that are not.”); Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288
(Fed.Cir. 2016) (“[A] search for a single test or definition [of what an ‘abstract
idea’ encompasses] in the decided cases concerning § 101 from this court, and
185
186
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Law Section Chair of the American Bar Association conservatively
put it recently “the Supreme Court has injected ambiguity into the
subject matter eligibility determination.” 193 The President of the
American IP Law Association agreed with that sentiment in his own
letter to the government on behalf of his law association. 194 The
patent bar and the USPTO remain lost on how to implement this new
patent eligibility test, even five years after the Supreme Court
decided Alice. 195 Interestingly, even the Supreme Court itself seems
lost in how to apply the test, as evidenced by the major
inconsistencies between its patent eligibility decisions. 196 Scholars
also noticed that the Court provided minimal guidance regarding the
boundaries of its new test. 197
indeed from the Supreme Court, reveals that at present there is no such single,
succinct, usable definition or test.”); Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
838 F.3d 1307, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring) (describing the
“semantic gymnastics” entailed in applying the Mayo/Alice test); BASCOM Glob.
Internet Servs. V. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., concurring) (“I have come upon no guide to when a claim crosses
the boundary between unacceptable abstractness and acceptable specificity.”);
Device Enhancement LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 392 (D. Del.
2016) (discussing the “still difficult-to-discern requirements of the Alice
analysis,” and the resulting “difficult exercise” under § 101).
193
Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Section Chair, Section of Intell. Prop. Law,
Am. Bar Ass’n., to Michelle K. Lee, Under Sec’y of Com. for Intell. Prop. and
Dir. of the USPTO (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_property_law/advocacy/advocacy20170117-comments.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/99CM-KVSQ] (stating
“the Supreme Court has injected ambiguity into the subject-matter eligibility
determination”).
194
Letter from Mark L. Whitaker, President, Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n., to
Michelle K. Lee, Under Sec’y of Com. for Intell. Prop. and Dir. of the USPTO
(Jan.
18,
2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
comments_aipla_jan182017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2EE-2UJ5] (outlining how
the Supreme Court’s recent patent eligibility decisions have caused “uncertainty
and inefficiency for patent applicants and litigants[.]”).
195
Id.; see generally Tran & Benevento, supra note 15.
196
Donald R. Dunner, The Supreme Court: A Help or a Hindrance to the
Federal Circuit’s Mission?, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 298 (2018).
See Donald R. Dunner, Response to Judge Timothy B. Dyke, 16 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 326 (2017); see also Golden, supra note 12, at 1770.
197
Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated
Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1798 (2014)
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Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, there was a highly divided
en banc decision at the Federal Circuit in Alice. 198 The Chief Judge
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) at the time,
Judge Rader, referred to the CAFC’s inability to render a majority
opinion in Alice as “the biggest failure of his career.” 199 In his view,
interpretation of Section 101 was simply settled law, based on Diehr
and Chakrabarty. Another former Chief Judge of the CAFC, Judge
Michel, predicted that Alice’s new test for patent eligibility would
“create total chaos,” stating that the test is “too vague, too
subjective, too unpredictable and impossible to administer in a
coherent, consistent way in the patent office or in the district courts
or even in the federal circuit.” 200
Further still, Judge Moore’s dissent in Alice, in which she was
joined by three other Federal Circuit judges, took a negative view of
reading judicial exceptions expansively. 201 As yet another indication
of how split the Federal Circuit was when it decided Alice, Judge
Newman stated in her own dissent that the court should return to the
express statutory language of Section 101 and Congress’s intent. 202
(“Unfortunately, the Court has provided little guidance with respect to the
readjusted contours of the newly invigorated doctrine, and as a consequence,
judges and the PTO have been thrown into a state of confusion with respect to the
proper application of the doctrine; the high degree of uncertainty is even more
problematic for patent attorneys and their clients.”).
198
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
199
Dan Levine, Insight: Rocker Judge Juggles Tech Policy, Supreme Court and
the Stones, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2013) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usajudge-rader-insight/insight-rocker-judge-juggles-tech-policy-supreme-court-andthe-stones-idUSBRE9BA06D20131211 [https://perma.cc/4HVG-GD9K].
200
See Quinn, supra note 25.
201
In her dissent in Alice, Judge Moore stated: “I am concerned that [in] the
current interpretation of § 101 . . . The Supreme Court has taken a number of our
recent decisions and, in each instance, concluded that the claims at issue were not
patent-eligible. See Bilski, Prometheus, Myriad (under consideration) . . . holding
that [all claims] are all patent-ineligible under § 101 . . . Holding that all of these
claims are directed to no more than an abstract idea gives staggering breadth to
what is meant to be a narrow judicial exception.” Alice, 717 F.3d at 1313 (Moore,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
202
Judge Newman also wrote separately in Alice: “I propose that the court
return to the statute, and hold that when the subject matter is within the statutory
classes in section 101, eligibility is established. This conforms with legislative
intent.” Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1326 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting
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The discontent among Federal Circuit judges vis-à-vis the new
patent eligibility test continues, and it is clear from the past year that
the judges are unhappy with the status quo. For example, in
Berkheimer v HP Inc., Judge Lourie concurred, noting that “the law
needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by Congress, to
work its way out of what so many in the innovation field consider
are Section 101 problems.” 203 In another patent eligibility decision
from last year, Judge Plager criticized the process of finding abstract
ideas as an elusive search for inventiveness, and asked “[i]s it any
wonder that the results of this process are less than satisfactory.” 204
That said, the Federal Circuit has tried to find a way to dampen
the toxic effect of recent Supreme Court decisions on patent
eligibility on key industries such as medical diagnostics and
software-driven bioinformatics. The Circuit provided guidance on
step one of Alice in Enfish, 205 stating that “focus[ing] on a specific
means or method that improves the relevant technology” is patent
eligible to validate protection for technologies in the software
industry, 206 and also provided some guidance on step two of Alice in

in part). See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“In
choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the
patent laws would be given wide scope.”).
203
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (Lourie, J., concurring) (stating that § 101 “needs clarification by higher
authority, perhaps by Congress” and opining that “the Supreme Court whittled
away at the § 101 statute in Mayo by analyzing abstract ideas and natural
phenomena with a two-step test . . . thereby bringing aspects of §§ 102 and 103
into the eligibility analysis”), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Oct. 3,
2018).
204
Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
205
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp, 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The case
stands for the proposition that software inventions may be patent-eligible, if the
innovation does not pertain to an abstract idea for which a computer is used
“merely as a tool.” This decision bucks the trend of invalidating software patents
as mere abstract ideas based on Alice.
206
See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2017); Visual Memory LLC v. Nvidia Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed Cir. 2017).
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Bascom. 207 Yet, although a few cases have survived the patent
eligibility challenge, many more such patents have been invalidated
under this new patent eligibility test.208
Thus, the main problem with expanding the scope of the
exceptions to patent eligibility is that inventions/discoveries in
biotechnology, and in particular medical diagnostics technologies,
tend to be intertwined with what occurs in nature. As described
above, this sector has been hit hard by the change in patent eligibility
laws with the Federal Circuit invalidating medical diagnostic claims
at an alarmingly high rate. For example, patent claims to methods
for determining a patient’s risk of developing cardiovascular disease
by detecting the myeloperoxidase enzyme in the patients’ blood and
making a correlation from the results to cardiovascular risk was
found to be patent ineligible subject matter. 209 Interestingly, in this
recent Cleveland Clinic decision, 210 the Federal Circuit aligned itself
with its problematic earlier ruling in Ariosa,211 concluding that claim
limitations directed to standard techniques will fail to pass the
Section 101 patent eligibility hurdle. 212 Five years on from Alice,
there are now many opinions by Federal Circuit judges expressing

Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
208
See, e.g., Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905,
909 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2000 (2018); Aatrix Software, Inc.
v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018); In re Marco
Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Roche Molecular Sys.,
Inc. v. CEPHEID, 905 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018); BSG Tech. LLC v.
Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Interval Licensing LLC v.
AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
209
Clev. Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
210
Id.
211
Discussed further infra Part VI.
212
Clev. Clinic, 859 F.3d at 1360 (noting that “each limitation Cleveland Clinic
raises, however, merely recites known methods of detecting MPO or MPO
derivatives and applies the correlation between these biomarkers and
cardiovascular health”); id. at 1361 (“Indeed, Cleveland Clinic has not created a
new laboratory technique; rather, it uses well-known techniques to execute the
claimed method.”).
207
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frustration by their inability to avoid the handcuffs of the Supreme
Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence. 213
Thus, the new patent eligibility test under Mayo/Alice is badly
suited for medical diagnostic tests that rely on newly discovered
laws of nature. The patent bar and all stakeholders in the technology
industry, especially in the medical diagnostics industry, are in dire
need of a clear test to use for determining whether a diagnostic test
that has its basis in a law of nature is patent eligible. There are
options for greatly improving the current status quo. 214
C. Disarray in Biomedical Industry Caused by the Supreme
Court’s New “Inventive Application” Standard for
Determining Patent Eligibility and the Misclassification of
Innovations in Medical Diagnostics as Laws of Nature or
Products of Nature
As defined in Section 101, the four categories of patent eligible
subject matter are: processes, machines, manufactures and
compositions of matter, 215 with the first category defining “actions”
and the latter three categories defining “things.” 216 The Supreme
Court created exceptions to these four statutory categories, finding
laws of nature, natural products of nature, and abstract ideas to be
patent ineligible subject matter. 217 In the Court’s view, inventions
that encompass these exceptions are “basic tools of scientific and
technological work” 218 that should be “free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none,” 219 and that this “reflects a basic judgment that
Id.; see Dunner, The Supreme Court, supra note 196.
See discussion infra Part VI.c.
215
For more detailed information on the four categories, see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure § 2106.03.
216
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), “The term ‘process’ means process, art, or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material.” See also 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2018); Corning
v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
308 (1980).
217
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012);
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013);
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
218
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
219
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
213
214
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protection in such cases, despite its potentially positive incentive
effects, would too often severely interfere with, or discourage,
development and the further spread of useful knowledge itself.” 220
For example, under this principle, Einstein may have discovered that
anything having mass has an equivalent amount of energy, but he
would not have been able to patent his celebrated formula, E=mc2,
that shows this relationship, nor could Newton patent his discovery
of the law of gravity, or a lay person patent his/her discovery of a
new mineral in the earth. These kinds of discoveries are
“manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.” 221
The problem with Mayo expanding the boundaries of the law of
nature exception to patent eligible subject matter is that it fails to
recognize that the very nature of molecular medical diagnostics
means that new discoveries in this field, more so than other fields,
are meshed with what occurs in nature. Whereas until now, most
medical treatments have taken the “average patient” into account,
personalized medicine using innovative medical diagnostics
technologies allows for a different approach and this includes
ultimately measuring how each patient’s body works and drawing
clinical conclusions. Thus, the very nature of these types of medical
diagnostic technologies easily trigger the exceptions expounded by
the Mayo trilogy. 222 Hence, unsurprisingly, the Mayo decision
resulted in a dramatic increase in rejections of patent applications
related to genetics and personalized medicine. 223 Moreover, in the
courts, the Federal Circuit rejected patent claims based on patent
ineligibility at an eye-popping rate of 94.1 percent in 2015 and 92.3
Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S.
124, 128 (2006).
221
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
222
Referring to the three back-to-back Supreme Court cases: Mayo, Myriad and
Alice.
223
Bernard Chao and Amy Mapes, An Early Look at Mayo’s Impact on
Personalized Medicine, 2016 PATENTLY-O PAT. L. J. 10. It should be noted that
this study did not include any analysis of the ultimate outcome of these rejections
in order to see if any rejections are withdrawn in view of attorney arguments,
something that would be important in assessing the ultimate practical effects of
the Supreme Court’s recent patent-eligibility decisions.
220
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percent in 2016, 224 with the number of Federal Circuit Section 101
opinions rising from just 19 in the five years before Alice to 156 in
the five years after Alice, an increase of 732 percent. 225
One recent case that demonstrates how difficult the lower courts
are finding Mayo’s implementation is Vanda. 226 In Vanda, the
Federal Circuit decided that the “method of treatment” patent claims
were not directed to a judicial exception and thus were patent
eligible subject matter, even though the claims appeared very similar
to the method of treatment claims at issue in Mayo. In Vanda, the
patent was directed to a medical diagnostic technology related to
treating schizophrenic patients with iloperidone. 227 The treatment
method involved first genotyping the patient to assess a gene called
CYP2D6, and then based on that assessment and extrapolation
concerning the schizophrenic patient’s metabolism, giving the
patient a low dose of iloperidone so as to decrease cardiovascular
side-effects if the genotyping step indicated it necessary. 228 Here, the
Federal Circuit in effect circumvented Mayo by sidestepping the
first step of the test, even though the “inventive concept” in Vanda
was ultimately, like in Mayo, a natural law.
Although the Federal Circuit was split in Vanda, the majority
decision tried to take the edge off of the destructive effect of Mayo
on the medical diagnostic industry by looking to find a way to parse
Vanda to be distinct from Mayo when not enough room existed
between the underlying medical diagnostic technologies to make
that distinction. As such, what we are left with is the uninspiring
position of having to draft patent claims to mirror the seemingly
patent eligible method of treatment steps in Vanda. That specter
leaves us with a position, for example, of having to just cosmetically
reword diagnostic method patent claims to recite a treatment based

Jasper L. Tran, Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 354, 358–59 (2016); see also Tran & Benevento, supra
note 15.
225
See Sachs, supra note 19.
226
Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1133
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
227
Id. at 1121.
228
Id.
224
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on the diagnosis, such that the claim only “touches upon” a law of
nature but is directed to a particular method of treatment. 229
Indeed, at least presently, the best chance of success on such
medical diagnostic method claims appears to be one in which
practitioners draft claims to recite an application of a natural law
specifically enough, such that the claim does not have to satisfy the
“significantly more” hurdle of the test in Mayo. 230 To draw on the
parallel abstract idea exception where claims are eligible if they
“recite a specific improvement over prior systems” 231 or enable a
computer or device “to do things it could not do before,” 232 patent
claims related to an overarching natural law, as medical diagnostic
claims commonly are, can sidestep the Alice and Mayo scrutiny by
including language in the claims to particular applications, for
example by including a treatment step of the natural law.
Most recently, in another medical diagnostic technology case,
the Federal Circuit upheld the eligibility of a claim involving an
assessment of a patient’s metabolic characteristics before a dosing
regimen is given to the patient. 233 In Endo Pharma, the Federal
Circuit deemed the claims to be “legally indistinguishable” from
those in Vanda. 234 Both Vanda and Endo Pharma recite method of
treatment claims to “steps of carrying out a dosage regimen based
on the results of . . . testing,” and both “require specific treatment
steps.” In both these recent biotechnology decisions, the Federal
Circuit points out that the inventors in both Vanda and Endo Pharma
identified a natural law and claimed an application of the
relationship they identified, not the natural law itself, 235 and as such
both claims were “directed to more than just reciting the natural
Id. at 1136 (“At bottom, the claims here are directed to a specific method of
treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific doses to
achieve a specific outcome. They are different from Mayo.”).
230
Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
231
Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
232
Finjan, Inc., v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
233
Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 919 F.3d
1347, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
234
Id. (citing Vanda Pharm. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117
(Fed. Cir. 2018)).
235
Id. at 1353–54 (citing Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1135).
229
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relationship.” 236 Indeed, the Federal Circuit distinguished these
cases from Mayo by highlighting that the patent claims in Mayo “as
a whole [were] not directed to the application of a drug to treat a
particular disease.” 237 As discussed above, although these may be
seen as Mayo working, the vast majority of stakeholders in the
biotechnology industry see Mayo as being destructive and hard to
implement and work with.
Mayo requires a determination of what is routine conventional
activity and what would be “significantly more” and “inventive.” 238
These are all subjective determinations and certainly not one that a
person not having ordinary skill in the art should be making. For
one, all other key sections of the Patent Act dealing with
determining what is new, obvious and whether an invention has
been described in sufficient detail, make these key patentability
determinations based on the skill level of an ordinary artisan in that
field. 239 In the current initial threshold finding of what subject matter
is even eligible for a patent, the view of the ordinary skilled artisan
is excluded. That is, another problem with the new patent eligibility
test is not only the subjectivity of having to determine what is an
“inventive concept” in a given technology (traditionally the
exclusive domain of Section 102), and what amounts to
“significantly more,” is “routine and conventional,” and what
“sufficiently transforms,” 240 but that all of this is taking shape
without the necessity of having the views of a person of ordinary
skill in the art take central role.
The test in Mayo is too subjective. It disregards the efforts of
skilled innovators and instead allows someone, typically an
examiner or judge with no skill in the art, to determine what is
Id. The Court found the combination of the “administering step” and the
“wherein clause” “identified the appropriate schedule and dose . . . to administer,”
so the claims did “more than just recognize the need to lower or decrease a dose.”
Id. at 1355.
237
Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 74 (2012)).
238
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73.
239
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018).
240
All concepts that are required under the new patent eligibility test under
Mayo and Alice.
236
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“inventive,” “significantly more” and “conventional” in a given
field of art. 241 A court determines who the person of ordinary skill in
the art is, using relevant factors, 242 however, the patent eligibility
determination should involve the person having ordinary skill and
not be left to the courts. In the field of medical diagnostic
technologies, that ordinary skilled person is typically a doctor who
either developed the test as a researcher or one who applies the test
in a medical clinical setting, not individuals who have less than
ordinary training in that medical diagnostic technology.
What makes the new patent eligibility test all the more terse is
that such subjective determinations on patent eligibility are
threshold determinations, meaning the invention is not even looked
at for true inventiveness or obviousness under the more established
objective tests of different parts of the Patent Act, if it is deemed as
a preliminary matter to be ineligible under section 101. 243
Furthermore, as discussed above, these determinations have
invalidated patents at the early stages of patent litigation, before any
substantive deliberations on whether the invention is new or
obvious.
Setting aside Mayo would be a step in the right direction by
restoring the Supreme Court’s older Diehr legal framework. Indeed,
if the Supreme Court had taken its own approach in Chakrabarty
and Diehr and asked in its deliberations in Mayo and Myriad
whether a claimed invention (considered as a whole and taking into
account the contribution of all elements) is found in nature, it would
have arrived at a different conclusion regarding these medical
diagnostic technologies being essentially a feature of nature. One
can only surmise why the Supreme Court decided to follow its much
older Flook and Funk Bros. approach than its own recent reasoning
in Chakrabarty and Diehr and the reliance in industry on these more
recent decisions. However, all is not lost as there are legislative
options to correct this error.

Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73.
Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
243
See discussion infra Part VI.c.
241
242
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D. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Parallel Law on Patent Eligibility is
Inconsistent with Express Statutory Language, and Runs
Against the U.S. Constitution
In situations where the U.S. Constitution has given sole
authority to Congress to create laws consistent with that granted
authority, the judicial branch’s highest court, namely the U.S.
Supreme Court, is then limited to that statutory construction. 244 In
this context, when the Supreme Court accepts to address a question
of patent law related to patent eligible subject matter, the Supreme
Court is required to construe the literal meaning of Section 101.
However, the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, discussed
supra, has departed from the literal meaning of the statue, instead
introducing its own law in the area of patent eligibility by creating
broad exceptions to the statute. In so doing, it has become clear to
many stakeholders that the Court has conflated, whether
intentionally or not, other existing statutory regimes concerning
patentability with the threshold issue of patent eligibility. 245 For
example, the new law for determining patent eligibility requires an
“inventive application” which is traditionally a concept dealt with
under the novelty provisions in Section 102 of the Patent Act. 246
Congress has been consistent with their intent concerning patent
eligible subject matter. Indeed, based on the legislative history of
Section 101, discussed above, and the fact that multiple Patent Acts
passed by Congress over a period of some 200 years, including the
244
Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). Indeed,
the Supreme Court in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank,
N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) has stated that “when the statute’s language is plain,
the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text
is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” (citation omitted). The
Supreme Court further states in Connecticut Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 253–54 that
“courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says . . . “ and going even further in its Connecticut Nat’l Bank
decision to be clear that “when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this
first canon is also the last . . . judicial inquiry is complete.” (citation omitted).
245
Paxton M. Lewis, The Conflation of Patent Eligibility and Obviousness:
Alice’s Substitution of Section 103, 1 UTAH ONLAW: UTAH L. REV. ONLINE SUPP.
13 (2017).
246
See e.g. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
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recently passed America Invents Act, have kept the concise
language of Section 101 largely unchanged, it is clear that no
exceptions were contemplated or intended. In particular, even where
Congress recently passed the America Invents Act, 247 the biggest
fundamental change in patent law in sixty years, major changes were
made to the law on patentability while those on patent eligibility
were left largely untouched. 248
These judicially created exceptions represent a direct afront to
the statute and run contrary to Congress’s express and implicit
intent, as well as their constitutionally mandated task of
“Promot[ing] the useful arts.” 249 Moreover, the statute clearly states,
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter . . . may obtain a
patent . . . .” 250 Thus, the Supreme Court’s fascination with
“inventive concept” fails to consider the word “discovers” in the
statute. Not only should there be no exceptions to the four statutory
categories of patent eligible subject matter as adumbrated in the
Section 101 statute, 251 but that any “invention or discovery” related
to these four listed categories should suffice to pass this intentionally
low threshold finding of whether a subject matter is deemed patent
eligible. The Supreme Court fails to acknowledge or discuss, and
indeed omits, any focus on the word “discovers” in their patent
eligibility jurisprudence. This can reasonably be deduced to be
because it does not fit the Supreme Court’s test, and yet there is a
reason that the statute includes this word. If anything, there is
nothing to indicate that the word “discovers” ought to have anything
less than equal weight to the word “invents” when the statute
expressly recites “invents or discovers.” And yet, the Supreme
Court recently in Myriad boldly undermined this, stating
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
248
The current version of the patent eligibility statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018),
states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.”
249
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
250
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (emphasis added).
251
Id.
247
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“groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by
itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” 252
Moreover, the Supreme Court has itself stated in Chakrabarty, 253
“Congress has intended patentable subject matter to include
anything under the sun that is made by man.” 254 The Court further
explained Section 101 eligibility and its scope by stating that “[w]e
have cautioned that courts should not read into the patent laws
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed.” 255 In choosing such expansive terms as the four listed
statutory patent eligible subject matters modified by the
comprehensive “any”, “Congress plainly contemplated that the
patent laws would be given wide scope.” 256 No exceptions were
contemplated, so long as any invention or discovery falls within the
four categories of patent eligible subject matter that have been listed
in the statute for over two hundred years. Contrary to the Supreme
Court’s recent interpretation, it is clear from both the express
language of the statute and its legislative history, discussed supra,
that patent eligible subject matter, under the Section 101 statute,
should be given wide scope.
The Supreme Court’s recent trilogy of cases on patent eligibility
runs counter to the plain meaning of Section 101 and its legislative
intent, 257 and is inconsistent with past Supreme Court precedent. 258
Tellingly, these past decisions provide very little analysis of
statutory construction or legislative intent. 259 Instead, seemingly out
of thin air, the Supreme Court created, and recently greatly
expanded the scope of, the “judicial exceptions” to the federal
statute that outlines the requirements to patent eligibility. This
contrarian jurisprudence by the Supreme Court has caused disarray
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 577
(2013) (emphasis added).
253
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
254
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 642 (2010) (noting Congress’s intention for
statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by man”)
(quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309) (citation omitted).
255
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp, 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933).
256
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added).
257
See discussion supra Part II.
258
Golden, supra note 12, at 1770.
259
Holman, supra note 197, at 1798.
252
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in technology-driven industries, harming especially innovation in
biotechnology and medical diagnostics fields in the United States.
V.
INHIBITION OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION CAUSED BY EXISTING PATENT
ELIGIBILITY LAWS
The U.S. Constitution requires Congress to promote
innovation. 260 Developing innovative new biotechnological products
takes much time and money; and depends on robust and predictable
patent protection, as an inducer for those who wish to take risks and
develop new innovative technologies. In the biotechnology, drugs,
and medical diagnostics field, the process for developing a new
disease therapy begins with basic research done to elucidate the
underpinnings of a disease, find potential targets and diagnostic
methods to detect various stages of the disease and ways to manage
it. 261 The developmental process can take many years and cost
between $2 and $3 billion. 262 Thus, any radical changes in patent
laws that disrupt this enticement of a reward for companies, can
greatly affect innovation by technology-driven companies. Sadly,
the radical change in patent eligibility laws has greatly affected the
medical diagnostics and personalized medicine industries.
In a recent elegant study researchers examined U.S. patent
applications that received patent ineligibility rejections. 263 The study
then compared that same technology to see if it was also rejected as
patent ineligible subject matter in Europe or in China. 264 In their
260
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8 recites “promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.” (emphasis added).
261
Andrea D. Eckhart et al., Metabolomics as a Key Integrator for “Omic”
Advancement of Personalized Medicine and Future Therapies, 5 CLINICAL &
TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 285, 285 (2012).
262
See e.g. Ricky Mullin, Tufts Study Finds Big Rise in Cost of Drug
Development, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Nov 20, 2014),
https://cen.acs.org/articles/92/web/2014/11/Tufts-Study-Finds-Big-Rise.html
[https://perma.cc/TDT9-SX9H].
263
Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent
Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO.
MASON. L. REV. 939, 941 (2017).
264
Id.
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empirical analysis, the authors questioned whether the impact of the
newly adopted patent eligibility laws are resulting in the U.S.
surrendering its long-held position as the world leader in new
technology development and commercialization. 265 The results
should speak volumes to law and policy makers: over 1,700 U.S.
patent applications spanning multiple technologies, including
everything from drugs and therapeutics, molecular biology,
combinatorial chemistry databases, immunology, microbiology,
telecommunications, artificial intelligence, to name a few, were all
found to be ineligible subject matter for patenting in the U.S.
because of the recently expansive Supreme Court patent ineligibility
regime. And yet, those very same technologies were all found to be
patent eligible subject matter in both the European Union and in
China. 266
In yet another recent study, 4.4 million office actions mailed
from 2008 through mid-July 2017 covering 2.2 million unique
patent applications were studied using a novel technology
identification strategy. 267 The results showed a spike in patent
eligibility rejections, especially in the medical diagnostics and
software patent applications following the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions in Alice and Mayo. 268 Interestingly, although this study did
not find a major impact on other fields, it did find that among the
patent applications directed to medical diagnostic technologies, the
patent eligibility rejection rate grew from 7 percent to 32 percent in
265

Id.
Id. at 941 (reporting that over 1,700 patent applications covering the same
inventions were rejected as patent ineligible subject matter in the U.S., and yet
were considered eligible in both China and the European Union). Abandoned U.S.
patent applications included in fields such as (number of applications in each field
shown in parentheses): Drug and Therapeutics (474); Molecular Biology and
Microbiology (356); Amusement Devices (245); Combinatorial Chemistry (238);
Measuring and Testing (83); Databases (80); Multicellular Living Organisms
(38); Structural Design (35); Control Systems (21); Business Methods (18);
Surgery (17); Chemistry (15); Immunology (15); Computer Graphics (14); Food
Or Edible Materials (11); Agriculture (10); User Interfaces (9); Organic
Compounds (8); Data Processing (5); Artificial Intelligence (3); and others.
267
Colleen Chien & Jiun Ying Wu, Decoding Patentable Subject Matter, 2018
PATENTLY-O PATENT LAW J. 10, 10 (2018).
268
Id.
266
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the month after Mayo and continued to climb to a high of 64 percent
and to 78 percent among final office actions just prior to
abandonment. 269
Moreover, many patent stakeholders have recognized this
negative effect of current patent eligibility jurisprudence, especially
on the medical diagnostics and personalized medicine field. For
example, Senator Coons recently commented that “[t]oday, U.S.
patent law discourages innovation in some of the most critical areas
of technology, including artificial intelligence, medical diagnostics,
and personalized medicine.” 270 To give further context to this
statement, a diagnosis of a disease generally occurs before
treatments and cures can be developed. As such, new medical
diagnostic tests typically precede the invention of new innovative
medical devices, with the latter typically trailing discovery of new
diagnostic tests by about a decade. 271
It follows that as a result of the negative impact the new patent
eligibility laws have on the medical diagnostics industry, far fewer
medical devices will be developed in the decade to come. This is yet
another unintended consequence of the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Section 101, especially as it relates to the
development of newly emerging medical diagnostic technologies
and follow-on development of new medical devices. Moreover, as
other commentators have pointed out, the recently promulgated
legal test for patent eligible subject matter in the U.S. is so opaque
as to create substantial doubt on the longevity of long-term research
and development and the growth of technological innovation in
general, including innovation in the medical diagnostics
technologies. 272
269

Id.
Sens. Coons and Tillis and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release
Section 101 Patent Reform Framework CHRIS COONS (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/sens-coons-and-tillis-andreps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-section-101-patent-reform-framework
[https://perma.cc/HA6Y-U5QZ].
271
See Brief for Medtronic, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
Bilski v. Doll 556 U.S. 1268 (2009) (No. 08-964), Lexis 728.
272
Sequenom Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 13 (describing the Supreme
Court’s new test for patent eligibility as overly restrictive).
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A. Profound Uncertainty Precipitated by the Supreme Court’s
New Patent Eligibility Jurisprudence Has Caused a Downturn
in the Biotechnology Industry
Some have highlighted that because of the recent changes in
patent eligibility laws “many inventions are improperly being
denied protection and there is significant uncertainty among
patentees and patent applicants as to the breadth of the judicially
created exclusions from patent eligibility.” 273 Biomedical innovation
and in particular medical diagnostics technologies appear to be
severely affected, with one Federal Circuit judge commenting that
“it is also said that a crisis of patent law and medical innovation may
be upon us, and there seems to be some truth in that concern.” 274
Moreover, according to the Biotechnology Industries Organization
and the Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America, this
trend presents a “dark cloud overshadowing thousands of issued and
maintained biotechnology patents,” which “affects future
investment decisions.” 275 Indeed, research has shown that “the
courts invalidated more patents in the 14 months since Alice, than
they did in the five years previous to Alice.” 276 This fundamental
change in patent eligibility laws has resulted in a disproportionate
impact on certain fields, including in medical diagnostic and
biotechnology industries. 277
Moreover, a recent study focused on the fundamental question
of whether the Supreme Court’s new patent eligibility legal
273
Amy Landers, The Interconnections Between Entrepreneurship, Science
and the Patent System, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 631, 631–32 (2016) (citation omitted).
274
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequnom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Lourie, J., concurring) (denying a petition for rehearing en banc).
275
Brief for the Biotechnology Indus. Org. (BIO) & Pharm. Research & Mfrs.
of Am. (PhRMA) as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants and in Favor of En Banc
Reconsideration at 3, Ariosa Diagnostics, 809 F.3d 1282 (Nos. 2014-1139, 20141144).
276
Robert R. Sachs, #AliceStorm: The Summertime Blues Continue, FENWICK
& WEST (Aug. 29 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/08/alicestormsummertime-blues-continue.html [https://perma.cc/JCA4-AX5G].
277
VOICES OF THE BAR, Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice? LAW 360
(June 17, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/668773 [https://perma.cc/
34NY-NDEU] (discussing the impact of Alice on industries such as the computer
and biotechnology).
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framework actually impacted decisions to invest in new technology
development and commercialization. 278 A survey of 475 venture
capital and private equity investors studied the impact of the Court’s
patent eligibility cases on their firms’ decisions to invest in
companies developing technology. 279 This study found that investors
overwhelmingly believe patent eligibility is an important
consideration when their firms decide whether to invest in
companies developing technology. These results are in tune with the
notion that patents are an absolutely integral part of capital
investment decisions being made to develop newly emerging
innovative technologies, including those in the biotechnology and
medical diagnostic field. Interestingly, investors view patent
eligibility as affecting different industries to different levels and
factor this into their capital investment decisions. For example,
whereas capital investment in construction related technologies is
only minimally affected by the new patent eligibility laws, the new
legal landscape is having a huge impact for these same venture
capital and private equity firms when they view a potential
investment opportunity in biotechnology and medical diagnostics
industries. 280
The investors have been turning away from investing in certain
innovation-focused industries, such as biotechnology and softwaredriven innovations, as a direct result of the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions on this issue. In particular, about 200 venture capital and
private equity investors indicated that the Supreme Court’s recent
patent eligibility laws had a somewhat negative or very negative
effects on their firm’s existing investments. 281 33 percent of
investors who focus on technologies reported that the new patent
eligibility laws impacted their firms’ investment behavior, with
David O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment (Feb. 24, 2019), Cardozo
L. Rev., Forthcoming; SMU Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research
Paper
No.
414,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3340937
[https://perma.cc/
BG8F-WTK3].
279
Id. (showing that with 74 percent of investors agreed that patent eligibility
issue is a key reason to invest or not to invest, and 14 percent disagreeing).
280
Id.
281
Jason Rantanen, Guest Post on Patent Eligibility and Investment: A Survey,
PATENTLYO (Mar. 6, 2019), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/03/patenteligibility-investment.html [https://perma.cc/82T8-VVV3].
278
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these investors reporting that they shifted their capital investments
away from companies that were developing new technology related
to biotechnology, medical diagnostics and pharmaceutical
industries. 282 This 2019 report adds to the data emerging regarding
how the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on patent eligibility are
harming the medical diagnostics industry and innovation economy
in the U.S.
Similar statements made by no less than the current acting
Director of the USPTO that the Mayo/Myriad/Alice test is damaging
technological innovation and economic competitiveness by giving
stakeholders very significant reason to pause when looking to take
risks to develop new emerging technologies because of the
Mayo/Myriad/Alice framework making for a weak patent protection
landscape. Indeed, this data supports recent study by other scholars
who highlighted for the first time empirical data to support the fears
of many stakeholders that the Supreme Court’s recent patent
eligibility decisions have set forth a dark future for the U.S.
innovation economy, especially as it relates to newly emerging
innovative medical diagnostic technologies. Those same
technologies that are being routinely rejected in the U.S. as being
patent ineligible subject matter are being found to be patent eligible
subject matter under the laws in Europe, Australia, and China. 283
Since the Alice decision, it has become much harder to obtain
patents in certain industries, especially in the medical diagnostics
and software industries. Unfortunately, this has stymied the
development of specialized software related to medical diagnostics,
such as artificial intelligence (AI) for better deciding and diagnosing
disease based on rapid readings and extrapolations of large data sets.
The practical results of which have been that innovation goes where
it has the best chance to grow. For example, it should be a warning
to our law and policy makers that Chinese AI start-ups are now
receiving more funding than American AI start-ups. According to a
review published in 2018 by MIT Technology Review, of the $15.2
billion invested in AI startups globally in 2017, 48 percent went to

282
283

Id.
Id.
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China and just 38 percent to America. 284 The U.S. is starting to lose
out in capital investments in key industries, such as artificial
intelligence which has interconnections to newly emerging medical
diagnostic technologies, highlighted by the fact that while the U.S.
accounted for 77 percent of such investment before the Alice
decision, that investment fell to 50 percent three years after the Alice
decision. 285
A study published in 2019 that surveyed close to 500 venture
capital and private equity firms about how their investment
decisions in new technologies changed since the new Supreme
Court created patent eligibility laws came into effect, provided
critical data for an evidence-based evaluation of how the havoc
caused by the Supreme Court has affected investments in new
technology development. 286 Professor Taylor makes a compelling
evidence-based argument, highlighting the negative impact of the
Supreme Court’s recent patent eligibility cases, namely
Mayo/Myriad/Alice, has had on capital investment, and especially
so on investment decisions being made on emerging innovative new
technologies in the biotechnology, medical diagnostics and
pharmaceutical industries. The study points out that these medicine
related technologies, even though they are the most impactful in
terms of public health, are the most impacted by reduced
investments in these industries directly because of the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions on patent eligibility. 287
These findings further support the position that Congress should
act to overturn the Supreme Court’s new eligibility standard to
prevent additional lost investment in technological development in
the United States. Indeed, given the results of at least the above two
Jackie Snow, China’s AI startups scored more funding than America’s last
year, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/
f/610271/chinas-ai-startups-scored-more-funding-than-americas-last-year/
[https://perma.cc/XT8R-HTKD].
285
Id.
286
The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Testimony of David O. Taylor
before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (June 4, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399699
[https://perma.cc/U3NN-KMCZ].
287
Id.
284
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comprehensive recent surveys, 288 it seems likely that the Supreme
Court’s eligibility decisions have resulted in lost investment in the
biotechnology and medical diagnostics fields and that this has
delayed or altogether prevented the development of new medicines
and diagnostics tests. This coupled with China taking market share
from the U.S. in emerging new technologies ought to spur
lawmakers to turn their attention to this pressing issue.
VI.
TO ENCOURAGE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND
THE USEFUL ARTS, CONGRESS SHOULD REVISIT
PATENT ELIGIBILITY LAWS
The Supreme Court’s uprooting of patent eligibility laws by
redrawing the boundaries of the judicial exceptions to statutory
language has now had several years to settle, and the effects have
been devastating. What biotechnology patent experts had predicted
has come to pass, with many diagnostic method claims falling
within the newly enlarged law of nature exception. Thus, in effect,
entities engaged in the research necessary to discover a disease
biomarker are now told their work is not even eligible for patent
protection, a determination with huge business, investment and
financial implications. Similarly, the expansion of the product of
nature and abstract ideas exceptions have encapsulated a wide
breadth of inventions, especially impacting methods used by
biotechnology and software companies, for example those running
medical diagnostic and bioinformatics technological applications to
assess gene expression.
This judicially created high threshold to what is patent eligible
subject matter was created out of thin air and directly conflicts with
the statutory language of Section 101 and its legislative intent. 289 No
better place can this uncertainty be seen than by looking at how the
USPTO, the practicing patent bar, the district courts, and the Federal
Circuit have interpreted and implemented the Supreme Court’s new
test for determining patent eligibility.
Patent office examiners were faced with no less than five sets of
very detailed USPTO-promulgated guidelines in as many years. The
288
289

Id.
Id.
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latest version of these guidelines reminded examiners that
Section 101 is not the sole tool for determining patentability. The
Supreme Court similarly has stated that “[t]he § 101 patenteligibility inquiry is only a threshold test” 290 and that the lower
courts should “tread carefully in construing this exclusionary
principle lest it swallow all of patent law.” 291 The Court also warned
in Mayo that it “has recognized, however, that too broad an
interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent
law. For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon,
or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” 292
Indeed, Section 101 was not written or intended to forego an
analysis under different statutory sections of the Patent Act of
whether, for example, major breakthrough medical diagnostics
discoveries are new and non-obvious.
Another problem with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
this issue is that when coming up with their Mayo/Alice framework
for determining the contours of their own created exceptions to the
explicit statutory language of Section 101, neither of the Mayo nor
Alice decisions addressed the legislative history of Section 101, nor
the legislative text or history of the 1952 Patent Act. 293 With Mayo,
Myriad, and Alice, all being decided within three years in the past
decade, it is clear that there is now wholescale expansion of the
scope of the exclusions to patent eligible subject matter. Ironically,
several years on, we are exactly where the Supreme Court warned
we could be: a situation in which the judicial exceptions to
Section 101 have all but “swallowed all of patent law,” and
“eviscerated patent law,” as the Court itself warned in both Mayo
and Alice. 294

See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010). (emphasis added).
Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (emphasis
added).
292
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)
(emphasis added).
293
See Sequenom Amicus Brief, supra note 21 at 26–28.
294
Id.
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A. Exceptions to Patent Eligibility Laws Are Unnecessary
Because Existing Statutory Patentability Requirements Prevent
Patenting a Law of Nature or a Natural Phenomenon
The Supreme Court decided eight cases in the last forty years
concerning the patent eligibility issue, which is far more than on any
other patent law doctrine, and it is noteworthy that four of those
eight cases were decided recently back-to-back. However, even after
these four recent decisions, the Supreme Court has been unable to
provide a workable standard that comports with the legislative
framework. If anything, as discussed supra, the current status of
how the Supreme Court views patent eligibility law is directly
inconsistent with statutory language and intent and has proved to be
unworkable, causing havoc in industries focused on technological
innovation such as the medical diagnostics industry.
After the Mayo trilogy, the maw of subsequent patent eligibility
rulings has greatly restricted the ability to patent certain
technologies, including medical diagnostic technologies, and
created inconsistency and uncertainty in the patent system. This is
no less reflected by the fact that the Supreme Court has recently
heard four patent eligibility cases in four years, and two
moreVanda and Berkheimerare currently pending certiorari,
with the Supreme Court inviting the Solicitor General’s view. 295
This has all contributed to a harder environment for obtaining a
patent, especially since the threshold to assessing whether a subject
matter is even patent eligible has been fundamentally raised. This
uncertainty has even reached the point where the Supreme Court
recently decided that a U.S. patent was merely a “public
franchise,” 296 which shocked observers because such a government
franchise can technically later be withdrawn.
While the judicial exceptions to Section 101 have had the effect
of making it much harder to obtain a patent in certain technologies,
and while these judicial exceptions are aligned with the policy of
having a smaller number of high-quality patents as opposed to many
weak patents, the method with which the Supreme Court has done
295

Id.
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, et al., 584
U.S. 1365, 1368 (2018).
296
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this, namely Section 101, has had unintended consequences for the
biotechnology and software industries in the United States. For
example, the highly regarded Cleveland Clinic and other major
public and private research and development institutions are
beginning to refrain from researching and developing certain types
of innovative technologies directly because they cannot gain
meaningful patent protection. 297 Further, no patent protection means
investors are unwilling to provide the capital necessary to develop
innovative R&D to develop medical and software-driven
technologies that can be deployed in hospitals and laboratories. 298
Thus, the Supreme Court was misguided to so fundamentally
change patent eligibility laws. If the concern of the Court has been
issues related to preemption as the Court indicated in Alice, and if
the goal therefore has been to not allow patents for the judiciallycreated exceptions, the Supreme Court should have refrained from
so vastly expanding the scope of these exceptions in their three
recent back-to-back cases. Instead, the focus should have remained
on other statutes, namely Section 102 (requiring the invention to be
new), Section 103 (requiring the invention to be nonobvious), and
Section 112 (requiring a detailed description of the invention) to
evaluate patent claims at issue. 299 Indeed, this article advances the
position that this strategy would simplify the subject matter
eligibility analysis for the USPTO, courts, patent owners,
practitioners and the public alike by prohibiting any determination
of
“inventiveness” 300
and
patentability
issues
under
Sections 102, 103, and 112 from the Section 101 analysis. As is
developed infra, 301 there are possible fixes to the current untenable
status quo.

Brenden Gingrich & Simone Ward,. Cleveland Clinic II: Has the Federal
Circuit Undermined Patent Office Guidance and Eliminated an Important Tool
(May
9,
2019),
for
Patenting
Diagnostics?,
JDSUPRA
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cleveland-clinic-ii-has-the-federal-23420/
[https://perma.cc/SLC9-U6B6].
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Id.
299
35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03, 112 (2018) (emphasis added).
300
Or “inventive concept” as is required under the Mayo/Alice framework.
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See discussion infra Part VI.c.
297

124

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 63

Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has made this clear: “[t]he
§ 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test . . . the
claimed invention must also satisfy ‘the conditions and requirements
of this title.’ Those requirements include that the invention be novel,
see § 102, nonobvious, see § 103, and fully and particularly
described, see § 112.” 302 In Mayo, the U.S. government urged the
Supreme Court not to depart far from the statutory language and to
keep a low threshold for determining patent eligibility. They urged
the Court to leave it to the parts of the Patent Act best suited to
determine patentability, namely novelty under Section 102 and
obviousness under Section 103. 303 Indeed, others have also pointed
out that provisions in the Patent Act should be used as the tool for
invalidating claims, not Section 101. 304
Yet, in its Mayo decision, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
U.S. government’s position, stating that it would make the “law of
nature” exception to Section 101 a “dead letter” and is not consistent
with Bilski, Diehr, Flook, and Benson. 305 With the exception of
Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court has hardly ever discussed the
legislative history of Section 101, 306 and instead has backed its more
activist current jurisprudence on Section 101 under Mayo by merely
referencing some of their own case law. The Court in Mayo refused
“the Government’s invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112
inquiries for the better-established inquiry under § 101,” and
resisted calls by the government in Mayo to heavily reduce the
influence of Section 101 and rely more on the traditional patenteligibility inquiry under Sections 102, 103, and 112. In the Court’s
view, shifting the inquiry to the other provisions of the Patent Act
“risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) (emphasis added).
See generally Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither
Party at 10, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012).
304
Jeremy C. Doerre, Is There Any Need to Resort to a § 101 Exception for
Prior Art Ideas, PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 10 (2019).
305
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89.
306
See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303 (1980) (referring to
the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 101, it is only limited to interpreting the word
“manufacture” and “composition of matter” since this case related to a modified
bacterium that could process and break down hydrocarbons).
302
303
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assuming that those sections can do work that they are not equipped
to do.” 307
However, many scholars, including the present author, disagree,
instead believing that Section 101 is not the “better established
inquiry.” As the Supreme Court itself has stated in Bilski, “[t]he
§ 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test.” 308 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the court in Diehr, even explained that
considering novelty under Section 101 was wholly inappropriate. 309
Seven years after the radical Mayo decision, the results are now selfevident and point to uncertainty in this area of patent law. There is
no question that this stifles technological innovation and the
development of new technology and commercialization, especially
in the medical diagnostics industry in the United States. 310 Sadly, the
Mayo decision has resulted in considerations of novelty, nonobviousness and the description of an invention, all being made
under the Section 101 patent eligibility umbrella. The result has
greatly elevated the importance of Section 101, while diminishing
the other traditionally more stringent statutory requirements of the
Patent Act. This is made even more problematic by the fact that
while the other key provisions of the Patent Act, for example novelty
and obviousness, take into consideration the ordinary level of skill
in the art in an effort to have an objective test, the new patent
eligibility test is very subjective and does not require the
involvement of the ordinary skilled artisan. Practically, this can
result in judges and examiners who have less than ordinary skill in
a particular technology, for example a medical diagnostic for liver
cancer, making subjective determinations of what the “inventive
concept” is, what amounts to “significantly more,” and what
qualifies as “conventional and routine activity” in that given field of
art.
Another problem of the current Mayo/Alice patent eligibility test
is that newly emerging breakthrough technologies, especially those
in the medical diagnostic field, fail at this preliminary threshold step
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 66.
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010).
309
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981).
310
Taylor, supra note 23, at 2155.
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and therefore are never commercialized or brought to market. This
is because the Supreme Court, contrary to the statute, made the
threshold of what is patent eligible subject matter so high. The test
fails to make substantive determinations of the technology in view
of a single prior art reference or what others have done to render any
such breakthrough obvious. Also, the current Mayo/Alice patent
eligibility framework does not factor in claim construction to any
great level. This is even though such claim construction, including
using intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, is a key feature of a
patentability analysis.
If the Supreme Court is adamant about maintaining its judicial
exceptions to Section 101, a potential way forward would be for the
Supreme Court to go back to the law of patent eligibility that existed
before it unilaterally expanded the scope of patent ineligible subject
matter in its Mayo/Myriad/Alice trilogy of cases. Indeed, by
disrupting a quietly settled area of law through their 21st century
Section 101 jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has magnified the
focus on Section 101 and exposed the strident inconsistencies on
how even the Court itself views patent eligible subject matter. 311 So
much so, that the Federal Circuit in their first decision involving
biotechnology and medical diagnostics after the Supreme Court’s
Mayo decision, ruled that an improved method of cryopreserving
hepatocytes obtained from liver surgery or organ donors is patent
eligible subject matter. 312 In so doing, interestingly, the Federal
Circuit chose to largely ignore the Supreme Court’s Mayo, Myriad
and Alice line of cases and instead follow the Supreme Court’s
Chakrabarty and Diehr decisions.

In Mayo, the Court held that if the concept is not inventive and otherwise
ineligible, the addition of conventional steps will not overcome a patent
ineligibility rejection. 566 U.S. at 66. In direct contrast, in Diehr, the Court held
that “it is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then
to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true
in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be
patentable even though all the constitutes of the combination were well known
and in common use before the combination was made.” 450 U.S. at 188.
312
Rapid Litigation Mgmt., Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
311
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The uncertainty on what the patent eligibility test is and how to
apply it has sadly resulted in the invalidation of some breakthrough
inventive technologies, 313 reflected, for example, by how the Federal
Circuit recently viewed the breakaway medical diagnostic
innovation in Ariosa. 314 For example, in that case discovering unique
fetal DNA in the blood of a pregnant mother and inventing a new
method for non-invasively determining important fetal
characteristics, as discussed below, should not fail the patent
eligibility test under Section 101, as it has recently. 315 Such a
medical diagnostic test may not be patentable if routine methods
were used to develop it, but the mere discovery itself ought to pass
the Section 101 threshold inquiry. The patentability requirements of
novelty and non-obviousness as listed in the other statutes of the
Patent Act, for example, ought to be what determines whether such
a discovery should obtain a U.S. patent or not. That is, patent
eligibility and patentability are not the same concept.
Judge Linn stated in a concurring opinion in Ariosa that prior to
the invention, prenatal diagnosis involved invasive techniques that
could potentially harm the fetus and increase the chance of a
miscarriage. In his view, “[b]ut for the sweeping language in the
Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion,” he saw “no reason, in policy or
statute . . . why this breakthrough invention should be deemed patent
ineligible.” 316 After Ariosa was decided the same invention was
found in November 2017 to be patent eligible subject matter by the
highest court of the United Kingdom and, as recently as in August
2019, that same invention was also found to be patent eligible by the
highest court of Australia. With the U.S. Supreme Court refusing to
grant certiorari in Ariosa, this technology, and many other medical
diagnostics technologies like it, remain patent ineligible subject
matter under current law in the U.S.
Michael A. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility in Biotechnology: a Look Under the
Hood, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2017); see also Michael A. Sanzo, The Patenting Of
Gene Based Diagnostic Assays In A Post May And Myriad World, 16 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2016).
314
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1375–76 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
315
Id.
316
Id. (emphasis added).
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As it stands, the four recent Supreme Court decisions—Bilski,
Mayo, Myriad, and Alice—have dramatically narrowed the scope of
patent protection for innovation-dependent industries, such as
medical diagnostics, by significantly expanding the judicially
created exceptions to subject matter that is listed as patent eligible
in the statute. Thus, there is growing discord among patent
stakeholders, precipitated by the lack of clarity regarding the scope
of subject matter that is eligible for a patent under Section 101. For
example, David Kappos, the former Director of the USPTO, called
for Congress to repeal the entire Section 101 statute from the Patent
Act on the basis that it is unworkable. Additionally, the current
acting Director of the USPTO, as recently as in 2019 and after
releasing a dizzying fifth set of guidelines to patent examiners in as
many years, 317 indicated that the landscape of patent eligible subject
matter remains troubling. Several senior judges have also voiced
their concern with current jurisprudence on Section 101, as
discussed above. 318 Some propose amending the statute so as to not
be out of line with the Supreme Court’s promulgated exceptions to
the statute. 319
The time is ripe for Congress to revisit the Section 101 statute of
the Patent Act. This article proposes a middle ground that does not
repeal the statute that has largely remained unchanged for over 200
years, but equally, does not propose amendments to the statute in
order to keep the Supreme Court’s parallel jurisprudence in place.
Instead, it advocates for a return to the statutory language and intent
and suggests an option for Congress to do away with the three
exceptions that the Supreme Court has unilaterally foisted upon
Section 101. This position is very similar to the one taken by Judge
Newman of the Federal Circuit in Alice. 320 In some ways it is also
similar to the position of the Intellectual Property Owners
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
EXAMPLES: ABSTRACT IDEAS (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/101_examples_37to42_20190107.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EF62-HVQZ].
318
See discussion supra Part IV.b.
319
See discussion infra Part VI.c.
320
See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269, 1321–27 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
317
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Association (“IPO”) which encourages an amendment to the statute,
stating that the “proposed legislation will: (a) reverse the Supreme
Court ruling and restore the scope of subject matter eligibility to
that intended by Congress; (b) define subject matter eligibility more
clearly and in a technology-neutral manner; . . . and (d) simplify the
subject matter eligibility analysis.” 321
Although the Supreme Court has previously overruled its own
interpretation of patent eligibility,322 it appears the Court is unwilling
to overrule or at least revise its recent incoherent decisions, most
notably in Mayo, evidenced by the fact that the Court denied
certiorari in Ariosa, an opportune moment for the Court to correct
itself. 323 In this latter example, over twenty amicus briefs from a
variety of interested parties and industries were filed and yet the
Supreme Court did not even ask for the Solicitor General’s view.
Jurisprudence on patent-eligible subject matter, governed by
Section 101, has currently entered a “maw” and the situation will
only get worse as new technologies advance because these new
advances will challenge courts’ interpretations of certain aspects of
patent law. 324 There is no question that current law governing patenteligibility under Section 101 is uncertain and in upheaval, and as
many stakeholders argue, there is a need for action from Congress. 325

INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASSOC., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PATENT
ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101, 2 (Feb. 7, 2017),
http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/20170207_IPO-101-TFProposed-Amendments-and-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6YA-26F3]
(emphasis added).
322
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316–17 (1980); Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981). These decisions effectively overruled Flook.
See id.
323
Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511, 2511 (2016)
(denying petition for writ of certiorari).
324
See Bernard Chao, Finding the Point of Novelty in Software Patents, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1224 (2013); Jeremy D. Roux, The Supreme Court
and Section 101 Jurisprudence: Reconciling Subject-Matter Patentability
Standards and the Abstract Idea Exception, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 658 (2014).
325
Shahrokh Falati, To Promote Innovation, Congress Should Abolish the
Supreme Court Created Exceptions To 35 U.S. Code § 101, 28 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1 (2019).
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B. Need for Harmonization: U.S. Laws on Patent Eligibility at
Odds with Other Industrialized Nations’ Laws
There are no statutes in the U.S. that have defined the kind of
inventions or discoveries that would fall outside the ambit of
patentable subject matter. 326 Indeed, the only category of invention
explicitly excluded by statute as patent ineligible subject matter is
the more recent recitation of nuclear weapons as a category for
which it is impermissible to obtain a patent. 327 This contrasts
European law where patent legislation explicitly lists the exceptions
to patentable subject matter. 328 Thus, unlike in Europe where there
is clear explicit legislation, in the United States it is left to the courts
to outline what kind of subject matter can and cannot be eligible for
a patent.
To highlight that the time is ripe for the U.S. Congress to act to
reign in the caustic harm that the judicially created exceptions to
Section 101 are causing to U.S. businesses and position on the
global innovation economy, one can review how other industrialized
countries’ patent laws address the same legal question. To make this
point, I focus on one recent example of a new medical diagnostic
method and discuss its treatment by patent laws of three
industrialized nations, namely the United States, the United
Kingdom and Australia.
In this example, the technology concerned whether the
discovery that there are fragments of fetal DNA in the blood a
pregnant woman and that this can be used to provide a non-invasive
way to determine fetal characteristics was patent eligible subject
matter or not. The test itself has applications of great value, namely
Even though the language of Section 101 has largely remained the same for
over 200 years, there reference to “invents or discovers” focuses on what category
is allowable subject matter, but there is no reference to what would not be allowed
as patent eligible subject matter in any U.S. stature, including Section 101. See 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
327
Perhaps tellingly, the Patent Act does not actually include this exclusion.
The exclusion is codified in the Atomic Energy Act, at 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a)
(2018).
328
European Patent Convention art. 52(3)–53, Oct. 5, 1973 (reciting the
exceptions to patentability, albeit the Europeans have strong views on their own
system of providing these exceptions).
326
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it is an improved technique that does not require taking fetal or
placental samples for screening for chromosomal abnormalities that
could affect a baby’s health and development, such as trisomy 21
(Down syndrome), sex chromosome aneuploidies, determining the
gender of a baby and the like. Since the commercial potential for the
prenatal diagnostic market is enormous, patent litigation ensued
between the innovator and copycats for this same technology in
several international jurisdictions, including in the United States,
United Kingdom, and Australia.
The U.S. position has been that this diagnostic method is patent
ineligible subject matter under Section 101 because the presence of
the cell free fragments of fetal DNA in maternal blood was a natural
phenomenon and the claims did not contain an inventive concept
sufficient to “transform” the natural phenomenon into a patent
eligible subject matter. 329 Thus, the invention is patent ineligible
because it falls under the judicially created exception to patent
eligible subject matter for being “naturally-occurring.” 330
Yet, in direct contrast to the U.S. position, Australia’s High
Court decided in August 2019 that this same discovery is patent
eligible subject matter. 331 Additionally, the High Court of Justice in
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2015). Here, a U.S. patent governing a method of detecting fetal DNA in the
pregnant mother’s serum was found to be directed to patent ineligible laws of
nature and natural phenomenon, and thus the patent was deemed to be invalid.
The Federal Circuit decided that the patent claims were generally directed to
detecting the presence of a naturally occurring thing or a natural phenomenon,
cell-free fetal DNA in maternal blood. Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that
the other elements of the claim, including using PCR to amplify the DNA from
blood, did not transform the ineligible patent claim into a patent-eligible
application of the natural phenomenon, reasoning that those additional elements
were well-understood, conventional activities.
330
Id.
331
Sequenom, Inc. v Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. [2019] F.C.A. 1011 (Austl.)
(Ariosa suggested that the Australian Court should follow the U.S. position.
Justice Beach’s response was an emphatic, “I hardly think so.” In fact, in
considering the Australian High Court Myriad decision, Justice Beach stated that
“in nature, the presence of cffDNA in the maternal blood has not and cannot be
detected without human action. Accordingly, unlike the claims considered in
Myriad, the invention claimed adds to human knowledge and involves the
suggestion of an act to be done which results in a new result, or a new process.”).
329
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the United Kingdom, similar to Australia’s High Court, recently also
heard this same legal issue, involving the same technology. 332 There,
in 2017, Justice Henry Carr of the U.K. High Court, similar to
Justice Beach’s August 2019 decision from Australia’s High Court,
found that such a patent claim is patent eligible subject matter. 333
The consistency between the U.K.’s highest court’s decision in
November 2017 and Australia’s highest court’s decision in August
2019 on this same legal issue involving the same technology,
finding the technology to be patent eligible subject matter in both
U.K. and A.U., greatly contrasts current U.S. law and puts the U.S.
position directly at odds with positions taken on the same legal issue
by other industrialized nations with well-developed legal systems.
Practically, this difference has had negative results for the U.S.
leadership role in innovation, especially so in the biotechnology and
medical diagnostics field as evidenced by a recent study. 334 Further,
as Judge Randall Rader, recently retired former Chief Judge at the
CAFC noted recently, “[f]rankly, there is no country in the world
Illumina, Inc. v. Premaitha Health PLC [2017] EWHC 2930 (Pat). Although
they did not receive their typical top-billing in this England and Wales Patent
Court case, Ariosa and Sequenom were still named as claimants.
333
Justice Henry Carr of the High Court of Justice in Great Britain wrote: “I do
not accept that, properly construed, claim 1 is a claim to a discovery as such. The
claims are not directed to information about the natural world, but rather to a
practical process, namely a ‘detection method’ which uses information about the
natural world. Claim 1 is directed to the detection of foetal DNA in a sample of
plasma or serum. Such samples do not exist in the natural world and must be
artificially created. The claimed method of detection is also an artificial process
which does not exist in the natural world. The claim is to a practical process of
implementing a discovery, for practical applications. The actual contribution, as
a matter of substance, does not fall solely within the excluded subject matter and
is technical in nature.”
334
Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 263, at 953 (reporting that over 1700 patent
applications covering the same inventions were rejected as patent ineligible
subject matter in the U.S., and yet were considered eligible in both China and the
European Union). Abandoned U.S. patent applications included in fields such as
(number of applications in each field shown in parentheses): Drug and
Therapeutics (474); Molecular Biology and Microbiology (356); Amusement
Devices (245); Combinatorial Chemistry (238); Measuring and Testing (83);
Databases (80); Multicellular Living Organisms (38); Structural Design (35);
Control Systems (21); Business Methods (18); Surgery (17); Chemistry (15);
Immunology (15); and others.
332
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that does what we do here. We have once again, set ourselves on a
course which is out of harmony with the rest of the world’s
intellectual property standards.” 335
C. Legislative Options and Ripe Time for Congress to Act
The impact of the new patent eligibility legal regime the
Supreme Court has ordered has been very negative. Although patent
defendants may rejoice, the consequences on U.S. private and public
enterprises conducting biomedical research, including those aiming
to commercialize new medical diagnostics, has been seismic. This
radical change in law has deterred the commercialization of certain
biomedical inventions because of the weakened patent protection for
those technologies and a disruption of the business ecosystem in
which they and their partners operate, including having a direct
negative effect on capital investment into such projects, as discussed
above. 336 As a result, there have been recent proposals to legislate
and change the laws governing patent eligible subject matter.
As of the beginning of 2020, the U.S. Congress is considering
making changes to patent eligibility laws. As an indication of
forthcoming changes to the law, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE)
recently said in at a conference that subject matter eligibility is “an
area where the jurisprudence is insufficiently clear, and which may
necessitate congressional action to provide clarity and
consistency.” 337
As 2020 begins, since the Federal Circuit has been unable or
unwilling to define the contours of what is and is not patent eligible
subject matter in view of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence
on the issue, a group of Senators and House of Representatives are
presently considering fixing the Supreme Court-created patent
Eli Mazour, The Most Interesting Man in the Patent World Fights to Improve
(Sept.
19,
2017),
America’s
Patent
System,
IPWATCHDOG
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/19/most-interesting-man-patentworld/id=87983/ [https://perma.cc/26YE-QFH9].
336
Id.
337
Chris Coons, A Few Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Section 101
Jurisprudence, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2017/02/08/thoughts-supreme-courts-section-101-jurisprudence/id=78166/
[https://perma.cc/9J3G-2BGM].
335
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eligibility problem 338 and they have released a bipartisan framework
for Section 101 reform in which they outline specific goals. 339 The
lawmakers seek to come up with legislative language, with the
anticipation being that bills will be introduced in 2020 in both the
House and the Senate. Many major patent stakeholders are also
encouraging Congress to act; for example, both the Intellectual
Property Owners Association and the American Intellectual
Property Law Association, both well-regarded professional IP
associations, have written to Congress asking the lawmakers to undo
the Mayo/Alice framework through legislation. 340 This is an
opportune time for Congress to do so because the time is ripe and it
is necessary. The time may be ripe, but what should Congress do
regarding patent eligibility?
Professors Lefstin and Menell have proffered a legislative
proposal of focusing on a “practical application” of an abstract idea,
natural law, or natural phenomenon. 341 The proposal would be to
align with pre-Mayo jurisprudence. This position also has some
backing from the ABA’s Section of Intellectual Property Law,
evidenced by their submission of comments to the USPTO that
As of Winter 2019, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE), Senator Thom Tillis (RNC), Congressman Doug Collins (R-GA) and Congressman Hank Johnson (DGA) currently have a four-principle framework for legislatively fixing patent
eligibility laws. Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers
Release Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act, THOM TILLIS, U.S. SEN.
FOR N.C. (May 22, 2019), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-andcoons-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-draft-bill-text-to-reformsection-101-of-the-patent-act [https://perma.cc/LM3A-GPAU].
339
Warren Woessner, Senate Committee Releases Outline for Section 101
Reform, PATENTS4LIFE (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.patents4life.com/2019/04/
senate-committee-releases-outline-section-101-reform/ [https://perma.cc/QE7YFLDW].
340
Dennis Crouch, AIPLA On Board with Statutory Reform of 101, PATENTLYO
(May
16,
2017),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/aipla-statutoryreform.html [https://perma.cc/946B-RDXK]. For an analysis of the different
proposals from the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO), the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), and the American Bar
Association Section of IP Law (ABA), see Brett Winborn, Patent Owners Versus
The Supreme Court: Changing The Law Underlying Patent Eligible Subject
Matter, 44 J. CORP. L. 187 (2018).
341
Sequenom Amicus Brief, supra note 21.
338
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largely agree with this “practical application” test. 342 Moreover,
Professors Lefstin and Menell, well-known patent law scholars,
submitted a supplementary statement, as recent as in Summer of
2019, to the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property Hearings on “The State of Patent Eligibility in
America.” 343
Yet, as reasonable and elegant as this “practical application” test
is to other IP scholars, including the present author who is a fan of
the proposal, from a pure practical standpoint, it may be hard to
effectively and universally implement. This would likely be
exasperated by the fact that patent examiners look for a test to easily
apply when examining patent applications in the trenches with little
time and many Office Actions to write. Indeed, to have some 10,000
patent examiners of all education and work backgrounds and over
200 Administrative Patent Judges at the USPTO, all trained to
effectively and uniformly examine patent eligibility issues based on
what would remain a convoluted subjective legal framework may be
asking too much. The reality is that it is likely overly ambitious to
expect patent examiners to perform this examination process
consistently, in a technology-neutral, objective manner.
In contrast, a recent article took an empirical approach and found
that the two-step test for patent eligibility may not be as impossible
to administer as many have suggested and in fact the test may be
clearer for certain types of claims than for others. 344 However, it is
noteworthy that this study used a survey of 231 patent attorneys,
which may not be reflective of the over 10,000 patent examiners, the
majority of which do not have a formal legal background. 345 Thus,
how clear the test is and how easy it is to apply remains up for
See Letters dated January 18, 2017 and March 28, 2017, from Donna P.
Suchy, Section Chair, Section of Intell. Prop. Law, Am. Bar Ass’n, to the Under
Sec’y of Commerce for Intell. Prop. & Dir. of the USPTO. The ABA submitted a
formal reform proposal in May 2017.
343
Peter S. Menell & Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Reforming Patent Eligibility:
Supplementary Statement of Professors Jeffrey A. Lefstin and Peter S. Menell, UC
HASTINGS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 336 (2019).
344
See generally Jason D. Reinecke, Is the Supreme Court’s Patentable Subject
Matter Test Overly Ambiguous? An Empirical Test, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 581
(2019).
345
Id.
342
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debate, with majority of stakeholders finding it more cumbersome
and unpredictable than not.
It may be noteworthy here to state that there are a minority group
of scholars who argue to the contrary on this issue. For example,
Professor Landers’ recent article studying the interconnections
between entrepreneurship, science and patents proposes a more
nuanced view than the linear model of innovation that directly links
patent law’s importance to basic science and innovation, and that the
recent restrictive nature of the patent eligibility laws has the
potential to maximize available information for entrepreneurship
and thereby promote innovation and not stifle it as the majority of
scholars have argued. 346 However, most scholars recognize the need
for action, describing the current test in a variety of ways, including
it being “too philosophical and policy based to be administrable” 347
and “a foggy standard cloaked as a rule.” 348
There is a clear chorus amongst the patent bar, drumming for
change to the current patent eligibility laws. Other proposals,
including one from former USPTO Director Kappos, have included
the wholesale repealing of the entire Section 101 statute from the
Patent Act on the basis that it is unworkable and is outdated since it
has virtually remained unchanged since the 18th century. And
although the Intellectual Property Owners Association’s position
may have evolved, they proposed amending the statute and that the
proposed legislative language would address patent-eligibility concerns
by reversing the Supreme Court decisions and restoring the scope of
subject matter eligibility to that intended by Congress . . . ; defining the
scope of subject matter eligibility more clearly and in a technologyneutral manner; and simplifying the . . . eligibility analysis. 349

This article respectfully presents yet another option, and one I
rank highly on available options, and that is to encourage the
lawmakers to look at Europe or even Japan, both equally
Landers, supra note 273.
Dennis Crouch, Eligibility: Explaining the IPO Legislative Proposal,
PATENTLYO (Feb. 9, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/02/eligibilityexplaining-legislative.html [https://perma.cc/7F5H-2T4H].
348
Michael Risch, Nothing Is Patentable, 67 FLA L. REV. F. 45, 45 (2015).
349
Id.; see also Michael Woodward, Amending Alice: Eliminating the Undue
Burden of “Significantly More,” 81 ALB. L. REV. 329 (2017).
346
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industrialized nations with developed legal frameworks, and analyze
their patent laws as a model framework on this patent eligibility
issue.
At the outset, the European Patent Office (“EPO”), much like
the USPTO, considers that the discovery of a natural phenomenon
not to be patent eligible. However, unlike U.S. law, the EPO takes
the view that a patentable invention can derive from a practical use
of that discovery, 350 such as its use in a method of diagnosis. As an
example, discovering a naturally occurring correlation between a
biomarker for cancer X can focus on the use of that discovery in a
new method to diagnose cancer X. Thus, in Europe, method claims
directed at diagnosing a disease by first detecting the presence or
levels of a biomarker in a patient are patentable, even if the
correlation itself is naturally occurring and not patentable.
Moreover, under their framework, the EPO determines
patentability based on two factors: a patent eligibility hurdle 351 (akin
to our Section 101) which requires the claimed subject matter to
have a technical character; and a patentability hurdle 352 (akin to our
sections 102 and 103), which requires the claimed subject matter to
contribute a technical solution to a technical problem. Moreover,
instead of undergoing a Mayo trilogy analysis as discussed above,
any application claiming an invention that falls into a category
prohibited by the European Patent Convention is expressly rejected
by the EPO. 353 In drawing parallels, any legislative fixes to current
U.S. patent eligibility laws, could model itself to be a “threshold,”
like Article 52 of the European Patent Convention, and thereby list
subject matter that doesn’t possess technical character, such as
mathematical methods, methods for performing mental acts or doing
business, and presentations of information.
Guidelines for Examination Part G-II 3.1, EUR. PAT. OFF.,
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/
g_ii_3_1.htm [https://perma.cc/6JR9-RFUH] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
351
Eur. Pat. Convention arts. 52, 54, Nov. 29, 2001, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
352
Id., arts. 54, 56.
353
The European Patent Convention specifically excludes programs for
computers, methods of treatment or diagnosis of the human or animal body, and
plant and animal varieties. Notably, the list of unpatentable categories is
considered non-exhaustive.
350
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This may be an easier approach to implement in practice,
especially by the very large number of patent examiners at the
USPTO. Indeed, it appears that as 2020 begins, a bipartisan
framework for Section 101 reform is under consideration by a
number of Senators and House Representatives, and one of their
goals is indeed to name a short exclusive list of categories, much
like in Europe. Under consideration are to list and thereby explicitly
exclude mental activities, pure mathematical formulas, products that
exist solely and exclusively in nature, fundamental scientific
principles and economic principles. 354
Instead of focusing on the idea of abolishing in toto the Supreme
Court created exceptions to the statute, other options include
amending the Section 101 statute itself in order to focus on the word
“useful” by deleting the word “new”. The aim here would be to
clearly highlight that Section 101 is separate from and different to
the “new” requirement of Section 102, thereby obviating the most
common criticism of the Mayo test. This would avoid having to
determine what is routine conventional activity and what would be
“significantly more” and “inventive” (or how new the claimed
invention is), thereby setting aside the highly disruptive Supreme
Court’s recent Mayo decision and restoring the Supreme Court’s
older Diehr legal framework.
Indeed, other options would be to go a step further and codify
Diehr and expressly state that in order to determine patent eligibility
under Section 101, novelty under Section 102 and obviousness
under Section 103, must not be considered, and thus also
highlighting that subjectively determining what is and is not routine
and conventional activity has no place in a Section 101 patent
eligible subject matter analysis. Finally, to harmonize Section 101
with other parts of the Patent Act, namely the Section 102 novelty
section, the Section 103 obviousness section, and the Section 112
definiteness section, Section 101 could be amended to include
parallel language that focuses on the person having ordinary skill in
the art, much like all the other sections of the Patent Act. This would
help to remove the presently subjective patent eligibility question
out of the hands of patent examiners at the USPTO and judges in the
354

See discussion supra Part I.

MAR. 2020]

Patent Eligibility of Disease Diagnosis

139

courts and make it more an objective analysis in parallel fashion to
other sections of the Patent Act.
It remains up for discussion what the final bills will say and how
lawmakers will attempt to remedy the current status of affairs. One
thing remains obvious: Section 101 cannot remain as is because
America’s leadership position on innovation and entrepreneurial
new technology development and commercialization is at stake.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Patent Act defines four independent categories of subject
matter that are eligible for patent protection, namely processes,
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. 355 The express
statutory language and its legislative history make it clear that
Congress intended to give a wide scope to patent eligible subject
matter. Yet, from these four broad categories that are listed in the
statute, the Supreme Court has judicially created three exceptions
and the Court recently vastly expanded the scope of these
exceptions.
This article advances the proposition that the biotechnology
industry and in particular entities developing the medical diagnostic
technologies of the future would stand to benefit from abolishing the
non-statutory, Supreme Court-promulgated, exceptions to Section
101 altogether, or at least by making certain clear amendments to
the statute, so as to bring certainty to this fundamental basic question
of the patent ecosystem: what subject matter is eligible for a patent.
These Supreme Court-created exceptions to the statutory language
have no constitutional or legislative foundation and have caused
great uncertainty in patent laws, harming the biotechnology,
personalized medicine and medical diagnostics industries. The
Supreme Court’s decisions on patent eligibility of the past decade
have damaged America’s standing as a leader in new technology
development and commercialization. The time is ripe for Congress
to act to correct the patent eligibility legal landscape and thereby
promote technological innovation, especially in the medical
diagnostics field.
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